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ABSTRACT
The Catalyst to Harm Standard is a specific standard that sets forth specific criteria for
the courts to follow so that they can factually determine if the speech in question falls into the
category of protected or unprotected speech. This Standard labels certain speech as “bad” not
because of its ideological or social content, but because it is speech that is linked to a definitive
social harm that the legislature has the constitutional authority to prevent or punish. This
Standard uses three criteria to determine the liability of speech that has allegedly caused harm.
In order to meet these requirements, the plaintiff must establish the harm that actually resulted,
establish the intent of the speaker, and establish a causal connection between the speech and the
harm that occurred.
While my Thesis is not the first research done on the topic of limiting harmful speech, it
is the first research paper to develop generic, step‐by‐step criteria by which courts can legally
punish speech that has caused harm.

The Catalyst to Harm Standard does not require

Brandenburg’s notion of imminence because there is no need for the “imminence” requirement
when punishing speech that has already resulted in harm. Instead, to impose liability, this
standard focuses on other factors such as harm, intent, and causal connection.
The purpose of the Catalyst to Harm Standard is not to impose an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech. Instead, this Standard only applies to speech that has facilitated and resulted
in harm. In adhering to the marketplace doctrine, this Standard is a punishment only for certain
speech that is too instrumental and intertwined with the performance of criminal activity to
retain First Amendment protection.
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CHAPTER 1
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION v.
PROHIBITED SPEECH

The greatest achievement of the First Amendment is that it liberates speech to do its
work—to facilitate thought, communication, and choice not only in politics but also in economic,
social and religious arenas as well.1 Free speech fosters creativity and dynamism in what Justice
Holmes called “the competition of the market” and Justice Brennan later termed “the
marketplace of ideas.”2 According to Oliver Wendell Holmes, “the primary goal of the First
Amendment is to guarantee a ‘marketplace of ideas,’ where truth and honest debate emerge from
a multiplicity of votes.”3
Under the marketplace doctrine, the First Amendment protects democracy by promoting
public discussion of competing ideas.4 Courts recognize the value of a free interchange of ideas
and maintain it by preventing the government from interfering with the development and
expansion of the marketplace.5 While the First Amendment establishes that any law regulating
speech is presumptively invalid,6 the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that certain
forms of speech may not be protected under the Constitution.7 People have the freedom to say

1

O. Lee Reed. The State is Strong but I Am Weak: Why the “Imminent Lawless Action” Standard Should
Not Apply to Targeted Speech that Threatens Individuals with Violence. 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 177 (2000).
2
Id. Reed quoting Holmes’ dissenting opinion in Abrams v. U.S. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1920) and Brennan in
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965).
3
Abrams v. U.S. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
4
John Rothchild. Menacing Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional Approach to Incitement that
Threatens. 8 Tex. J. Women & L. 207 (1999).
5
Debra M. Keiser. Regulating the Internet: A Critique of Reno v. ACLU. 62 Alb. L. Rev. 769 (1998). In
her article, she quotes Holmes from the Abrams opinion.
6
“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech …” citing the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
7
See, e.g. Gitlow v NY 268 U.S. 652, 666-667 (1925): Here, the Court held that individual states have the
authority to prohibit speech and publication if the state feels as though the speech or publication in question
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and think whatever they want, but when those thoughts and words turn into kicks and punches,
courts have held speakers responsible for their actions. The power to speak also includes the
responsibility to avoid unreasonable harm.8

Speech that results in harm must be balanced

against First Amendment interests, which has resulted in a very limited number of unprotected
categories of speech. However, with the advent of the Internet, so‐called pedophilic speech—
speech that glorifies or encourages pedophilia—has raised concerns that this form of speech
contains a degree of toxicity that might justify a more intrusive form of government regulation
than other forms of controversial speech. This thesis examines how constitutional and tort law
doctrines might intersect to provide a legal remedy to those who are injured by such speech.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The freedom of speech is not absolute.9 Certain forms of speech, such as core political
speech and religious expression, are entitled to the strongest level of constitutional protection.
Other categories of speech do not enjoy constitutional protection because of the harm caused by
the speech.

10

However, the First Amendment does not allow the government to engage in

viewpoint discrimination when suppressing otherwise prohibited forms of speech.11 The First
Amendment imposes this limitation on the government’s power to suppress speech in order to
adhere to the “marketplace of ideas” principle that counterspeech is preferable to censorship.
According to this rationale, if speech is not likely to result in unlawful conduct right away—in
other words, if there is time for counterspeech—then there is no basis for restricting the speaker’s
freedom to voice his views.12

has the potential to result in actions that pose a threat to public security, even though such utterances create
no clear and present danger. See also Dennis v. U.S. 341 U.S. 494 (1919), and Yates v. U.S. 354 U.S. 298
(1957); where the Court drew a distinction between the advocacy and teaching of an abstract principle and
the advocacy and teaching of concrete action. Consequently, the Court ruled that language of incitement to
action is not constitutionally protected.
8
Stephen C. Jacques. Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the First Amendment, and the Marketplace
of Ideas. 46 Am. U .L. Rev. (1997) 1945,1949.
9
S. Elizabeth Wiborn Malloy, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy:
Getting Beyond Brandenburg. 41 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 1159 (2000).
10
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568 (1942). With this case, the Court ruled that some forms of
expression such as obscenity and fighting words are not protected under the First Amendment.
11
Malloy, Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 9.
12
Rothchild, supra note 4.
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However, the Supreme Court has ruled that child pornography falls squarely into the
category of unprotected speech.13 The Court justifies its position by balancing safety against
unrestricted speech, concluding that the right of unrestricted speech is outweighed by the
substantial government interest in the safety of children.14

Safeguarding the physical and

psychological welfare of a minor is one of the government’s highest priorities, and the Court has
ruled that the welfare of children supercedes an individual’s right to engage in the harmful
practice of child pornography.15
Consequently, pedophilic speech—speech that constitutes the expression, advocacy,
teaching, and exhortation of pedophilic ideas as a socially acceptable way of life— has received
some protection under the Constitution.16 In New York v. Ferber the Supreme Court recognized
the government’s interest in banning child pornography.17 However, the judicial system has not
gone so far as to constitutionally limit the dissemination of pedophilic ideas.18 As a result,
pedophiles and pedophile organizations may exist and operate under some protection from the
First Amendment.

The question is whether the government’s interest in regulating child

pornography, as recognized in Ferber, justifies a more intrusive governmental regulation of
speech that promotes pedophilia and hence the production of child pornography itself.

13

N.Y. v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982). With this case, the Court distinguished child pornography from
regular obscenity. The Court gave 5 primary reasons why there should be greater leeway in criminalizing
child pornography. First, “it is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a state’s interest in
‘safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor’ is ‘compelling’”(at 756). Second, “the
distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the
sexual abuse of children…” (at 759). Third, “the advertising and selling of child pornography provide an
economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, and activity illegal
throughout the Nation” (at 761). Fourth, “the value of permitting live performances and photographic
reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis” (at
762). Fifth, “recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material outside the protection
of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions” (at 763).
14
Keiser, supra note 5; see also Jacques, supra note 8
15
Ferber at 773.
16
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 535 U.S. 234 (2002). With this case, the Court invalidated the Child
Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA), which attempted to restrict virtual child pornography. This Act
restricted computer-generated images that are or appear to be minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
The CPPA’s drafters said that virtual porn feeds the motivations of the pedophile, rendering him more
dangerous. However, the Court held that the CPPA was unconstitutional because because it was regulating
the speech based on its content. (2002). See also Reno v. ACLU 521 U.S. 844 (1997): Here, the Court held
that the 1996 Communications Decency Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations
involving obscenity, indecency, and child pornography amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of
free speech.
17
Ferber, at 773.
18
See e.g. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234; ACLU 521 U.S. 844.
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Differentiating between protected and prohibited speech is a complicated task; therefore,
the intent of this research is not to impose an unconstitutional prior restraint on pedophilic
speech.

According to the marketplace doctrine, society will determine the legitimacy of

pedophilic speech. Instead, this research is designed to create a specific standard to determine if
advocacy that facilitates harm is punishable under the First Amendment.
This Thesis will study the questionable nature of pedophilic advocacy to determine when
such speech is allowable and when it is illegal. With cases like Gitlow and Brandenburg, the Court
established that certain speech is punishable, even though the law requires that the speech only
can be punished after a physical crime has taken place.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As this study will point out, lawmakers have tried on more than one occasion to limit the
free speech rights of pedophiles, but proposed laws attempting to regulate this speech has been
struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional content‐based restrictions on free speech.
However, the Court has ruled that certain speech—for instance, speech that creates or incites
harmful action—is not protected under the First Amendment.19 The research questions, then, are:
(1) does pedophilic speech lose its protection under the Constitution once that speech moves
beyond mere advocacy and actually facilitates harm; and (2) is there a constitutionally sound
method of making pedophile organizations liable for the harm that arises because of their
speech?

THE JEFFREY CURLEY CASE
These questions are implicated in a recent case of first impression, Barbara and Robert
Curley v. The North American Man/Boy Love Association, et al.20 The North American Man‐Boy Love

19

See e.g. Gitlow 268 U.S. 652, and Dennis 341 U.S. 494, supra note 7. Also see Brandenburg v. Ohio 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
20
Barbara and Robert Curley v. The North American Man/Boy Love Association, et al District Court of
Massachusetts; Docket No. 00CV10956 GA09 (2000).
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Association (NAMBLA) is a pedophile organization that advocates the legalization of sex
between men and young boys.21 NAMBLA was formed in 1978 and calls for the sexual liberation
and empowerment of youth.22 The group produces a substantial amount of literature on the
subject, supporting the abolition of age‐consent laws, the release of convicted pedophiles from
prison, and the legalization of child pornography. The organization also publishes the NAMBLA
Bulletin, a publication containing various articles and letters chronicling the man/boy sexual
experiences of its various members as well as pictures of “cute boys.” NAMBLA also distributes
questionable publications like “The Survival Manual:

The Man’s Guide to Staying Safe in

Man/Boy Relationships,” and “Rape and Escape,” which has been criticized for promoting the
rape of young male children. The NAMBLA website supports the idea of children “learning
intimacy from an experienced adult,” as well as “ending the oppression of men and boys in
mutually consensual relationships.”23 The organization claims that prohibiting man‐boy sex is
“sexual prejudice and oppression.”24

This organziation also argues that pederasty—sexual

relations between an adult male and a male child—is a freedom issue.25
NAMBLA is not alone in its advocacy of pedophilic issues.

Several pedophile

organizations publicly advocate having sex with children, and they even petition for society to
recognize pedophilia as being no different than heterosexuality or homosexuality. The Pedophile
Liberation Front, for example, believes that pedophilic sexuality is better than “normal” sexuality
because pedophiles are “more caring and more focused on feelings than non‐pedophilic
21

Julie Foster, “Kids, sex, the Internet,” (2000) available at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news.asp?ARTICLE_ID=17905. According to her article, NAMBLA
distributes a quarterly publication called the NAMBLA Bulletin, which contains various articles and letters
chronicling the man/boy sexual experiences of its various members. One statement from the bulletin says,
“call it love, call it lust, call it whatever you want. We desire sex with boys and boys, whether society is
willing to admit it, desire sex with us.”
22
Id. The NAMBLA Constitution and Position Papers state that “…children especially, and all people in
general, must be empowered to have control over all aspects of their lives, so far as the exercise of that
control does not infringe on the rights of others. Children in our society are presently denied that control
and are treated in the law and in fact as virtually the property of their parents and wards of the state, to be
used as their parents and the state wish.”
23
This information is found on NAMBLA’s website, http://www.nambla.de. The NAMBLA Bulletin
includes articles and letters defending and reporting the sexual experiences of NAMBLA members, as well
as “nice collection[s] of photos of cute boys (practically on every page).” One article published in the
NAMBLA Bulletin criticized “contemporary sexual morality,” and the article went on to condone sexual
relationships between teachers and students, noting how they were seen in a positive light in ancient Greek
culture. Art Moore, “Amazon sells ‘deadly’ pedophile magazine—NAMBLA Bulletin name in suit
involving rape and murder of boy,” (2003) available at
http://www.WorldNetDaily.com/news.asp?ARTICLE_ID=34694.
24
Id.
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sexuality.”26 The Rene Guyon Society supports the sexual liberation of consenting children over
four years of age. The group’s motto is “Sex by year eight or else it’s too late.”27
A tragic incident in Massachusetts helped illuminate the potential problems associated
with protecting pedophilic speech. Three years ago, a lawsuit was filed in U.S. District Court by
the family of a 10‐year‐old boy named Jeffrey Curley. Curley was abducted and killed by two
men—25‐year‐old Charles Jaynes and 24‐year‐old homosexual lover28 Salvatore Sicari. According
to police, Jaynes reportedly viewed NAMBLA’s website shortly before attempting to molest and
murder Jeffrey Curley.

At two separate trials, prosecutors said Jaynes had NAMBLA

publications in his possession, and that Jayne and Sicari were sexually obsessed with Curley, and
that the two men reportedly lured the boy from his neighborhood by promising him a new bike.
The two men then allegedly pounced and smothered Curley with a gasoline‐soaked rag when he
resisted their sexual advances. Jaynes and Sicari then stuffed him into a concrete‐filled container
and dumped it into a Maine river.
According to police, Charles Jaynes joined NAMBLA in the fall of 1996. According to the
evidence presented in the criminal case, Charles Jaynes received and read the NAMBLA Bulletin
(a publication containing various articles and letters chronicling the man/boy sexual experiences
of its various members as well as pictures of “cute boys”), accessed and read the NAMBLA
website and began to collect child pornography and various pedophilic materials. The NAMBLA
Bulletin was mentioned in Jaynes’ diary, which was discovered by police after Jeffery Curley’s
murder.

Finding NAMBLA, Jaynes wrote, “was a turning point in discovering myself.

NAMBLA’s Bulletin helped me to become aware of my own sexuality and acceptance of it.”29
Curley’s parents claimed NAMBLA and its pedophilic publications facilitated their son’s
murder, but NAMBLA contends that it denies encouraging coercion, rape, or violence. The
plaintiffs claimed that as a direct and proximate result of the urging, advocacy, conspiring and

25

This information is presented in various links at the organization’s website, www.nambla.de
Michael Sheetz. Cyberpredators: Police Internet Investigations Under the Florida Statute 847.0135. 54
U. Miami L.Rev. 405, 417-18 (2000).
27
Chad. R. Fears. Shifting the Paradigm in Child Pornography Criminalization: United States v. Maxwell.
BYU L. Rev. 835, 836 (1998).
28
Art Moore, “Amazon sells ‘deadly’ pedophile magazine—NAMBLA Bulletin named in suit involving
rape and murder of boy,” (2003) available at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news.asp?ARTICLE_ID=34694.
29
Id.
26
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promoting of pedophile activity by NAMBLA, Charles Jaynes became obsessed with having sex
with and raping young male children. Also, as a direct and proximate result of the urging,
advocacy and promoting of pedophile activity by NAMBLA, Charles Jaynes stalked 10‐year‐old
Jeffrey Curley and eventually abducted, tortured, murdered and mutilated Jeffrey Curleyʹs body
on or about October 1, 1997. 30 The lawsuit alleges that after Jaynes joined NAMBLA in 1996, he
“became obsessed with having sex with and raping young male children,” and “as a result of
reading NAMBLA’s quarterly bulletin, he came to cope with his feelings and his desires, and
then he came to realize it’s OK to rape little boys, and that’s what he went and did.”31 According
to testimony in the criminal trial, Charles Jaynes accessed NAMBLAʹs website at the Boston
Public Library prior to murdering Jeffrey Curley to gain psychological comfort for his actions.32
Jaynes was convicted of second‐degree murder and is able to receive parole in 23 years. Sicari
was convicted of first‐degree murder and is serving a life sentence without the possibility of
parole.
A Massachusetts superior court judge awarded the Curleys $328 million in a civil suit
against NAMBLA, but the organization has appealed and their liability in this case is currently
being contested. In their official complaint against NAMBLA, the Curleys contended that
NAMBLA is an organization that falsely alleges it is non‐profit in nature as defined by the
Internal Revenue Code of the United States of America. The plaintiffs also contend that the
organization exists for the purpose of changing society’s attitudes about man‐boy love through
publications, educational and political activities, and membership conferences.

Although

NAMBLA contends that it is a lawful non‐profit organization working to change societyʹs
attitudes on pedophile activity, the plaintiffs claim NAMBLA is not a recognized non‐profit
organization by the United States of America or any state in the United States. However, acting
as an overt pedophile organization, NAMBLA provides resources to pedophiles seeking
information about sexual relationships between boys. Its mission statement says the group
“supports the rights of all people to engage in consensual relations, and we oppose laws which
destroy loving relationships merely on the age of the participants.” The NAMBLA Constitution
and Position Papers stat that “…children especially, and all people in general, must be
30

Barbara and Robert Curley v. The North American Man-Boy Love Association, et al. District Court of
Massachusetts; Docket No. 00CV10956 GAO9 (2000).
31
Moore, supra note 1.
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empowered to have control over all aspects of their lives, so far as the exercise of that control
does not infringe on the rights of others. Children in our society are presently denied that control
and are treated in the law and in fact as virtually the property of their parents and wards of the
state, to be used as their parents and the state wish.”33
The organization publishes a quarterly bulletin, which it distributes throughout the
United States and Europe and maintains a website on the Internet at www.nambla.org (changed
to www.nambla.de), while it also attempts to associate itself with the Gays Rights Organizations
in the United States to justify its advocacy of men having sex with male children.34

The

organization regularly distributes a publication called the NAMBLA Bulletin, which contains
various articles and letters chronicling the man/boy sexual experiences of its various members.
One statement from the bulletin, as printed in the lawsuit, says, ʺcall it love, call it lust, call it
whatever you want. We desire sex with boys and boys, whether society is willing to admit it,
desire sex with us.ʺ35 The NAMBLA Bulletin, which includes articles and letters defending and
reporting the sexual experiences of NAMBLA members, as well as ʺnice collection[s] of photos of
cute boys (practically on every page).36 One article published in the NAMBLA Bulletin criticized
“contemporary sexual morality.” The article condoned sexual relationships between teachers
and students, noting how they were seen in a positive light in ancient Greek culture.37
Public libraries have been identified by the plaintiffs as places for NAMBLA members to
meet or visit. The plaintiffs contend that NAMBLA members travel to Thailand to have sex with
young males. The plaintiffs go on to contend that NAMBLA also serves as a conduit for an
underground network of pedophiles in the United States who use their NAMBLA association,
32

Julie Foster, “ACLU defends child-molester group,” (2000) available at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news.asp?ARTICLE_ID=18029.
33
Julie Foster, “Kids, sex, the Internet,” (2000) available at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news.asp?ARTICLE_ID=17905.
34
www.nambla.de
35
Moore, supra note 1.
36
The statement, “a nice collection of photos of cute boys (practically on every page),” was excerpted from
NAMBLA Bulletin No. 184. The other information is presented on various links at the organization’s
website, www.nambla.de. For a profit on or about October 11, 1996, Defendant John Doe was the Internet
service provider to NABMLA and—according to prosecutors—intentionally, negligently, recklessly, and
carelessly provided technical support to NAMBLA to create and maintain the NAMBLA website. John
Doe Inc. at all times provides the international website communications systems for pedophiles in North
America under the name of NAMBLA which intentionally promotes child pornography and pedophilic
activity, according to the Curley’s complaint. The Plaintiffs allege that John Doe Inc. allows NAMBLA to
“reach more people and provide a more scattered target for” law enforcement officials.
37
Moore, supra note 1.
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contacts, and the Internet website to obtain child pornography and promote pedophile activity.
The organization maintains two mailing addresses in the United States,38 and NAMBLAʹs voice
mail system is established for the purpose of providing communication to and between itʹs
members and to impede law enforcement investigation of itʹs membersʹ activities.
In their case against NAMBLA, the parents of Jeffrey Curley allege that hundreds of
pages of NAMBLA publications were found in the possession of the murderers, who, according
to police, accessed NAMBLA’s website at the Boston Public Library just before endeavoring to
abduct, molest, mutilate, and murder Jeffrey Curley. Introduced into evidence in the criminal
trial of Jaynes was a NAMBLA publication found in Jaynes’ vehicle titled “The Survival Manual:
The Man’s Guide to Staying Safe in Man/Boy Sexual Relationships.” In addition to “The Survival
Manual,” police also found in Jaynes’ possession a manual published by NAMBLA called “Rape
and Escape,” which was described by the plaintiffs as an explicit guide to luring children and
then avoiding prosecution.39 In their wrongful death lawsuit against NAMBLA, the plaintiffs
claim that portions of NAMBLA’s web‐based and print publications “promoted, advocated,
conspired, and urged the general public to rape young male children and provide information to
assist the general public in obtaining child pornography and pedophile‐related material.”40
In response to the superior court’s decision, NAMBLA filed a motion to dismiss the
Curley’s complaint for a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This motion is
still pending before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The
defendants contested that NAMBLA materials constitute advocacy of this kind, instead claiming
that these material condemn sex abuse and coercive sexual relations.
Furthermore, the defendants maintained that although NAMBLA opposes age‐of‐
consent laws and provides pornographic material, NAMBLA does not urge, advocate, or
condone raping young male children. The defendants alternatively contend that even if such

38

One location is a mail box location at 537 Jones Street, P.O. Box 8418, San Francisco, California 94102.
This mailing address is maintained by Defendant Schoen. NAMBLA’s second mailing address is P.O. Box
174, Midtown Station, New York, New York 10018. This mailing address is maintained by Defendant
Radow from his residence at 17520 Wexford Terrace, Jamaica, New York 11432. NAMBLA maintains
two voice mail telephone numbers—one telephone number is 415-281-0767 and is located in San
Francisco, California; the second telephone number is 212-631-1194 and is located in New York, New
York.
39
Moore, supra note 1.
40
Barbara and Robert Curley v. NAMBLA, supra note 3.
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advocacy can be perceived from these Internet and print materials, the plaintiff’s action is
nonetheless barred by the First Amendment under Brandenburg v. Ohio. First, they claim that
because the plaintiffs do not allege that the so‐called advocacy was directed to any particular
person, but rather to the public at large, the speech cannot be “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action.” The defendants argue that aiming speech to a particular individual is
necessary in order to constitute advocacy.

Second, the defendants argue that any conduct

arguably advocated by the defendants’ publications was not imminent. In other words, Jeffrey
Curley’s death was not the likely result of the defendants’ publications.
The American Civil Liberties Union, which is serving as NAMBLA’s defense, calls the
charges against NAMBLA “unconstitutional,” claiming the organization is being sued simply
because of its ideas. “What they don’t like is what NAMBLA stands for,” said an ACLU legal
director. “They don’t like their ideas or the notion that someone else would have accepted
them,” he told the Boston Globe.41
According to the ACLU, the newsletters and other NAMBLA materials in Jaynes’
possession, which contain “photographs of boys of various ages and nude drawings of boys,” are
protected speech under the Constitution. According to the defense, the material does not “urge,
promote, advocate or even condone torture, mutilation, or murder.” The ACLU has filed a
motion to dismiss the case: “Examination of the materials that have been identified by the
plaintiffs will show that they simply do not advocate violation of the law,” the dismissal motion
states. “But even if that were the case, speech is not deprived of the protection of the First
Amendment simply because it advocates an unlawful act.”42

THE EVOLUTION OF FREE SPEECH
Courts have been reluctant to punish organizations—particularly media outlets—for
harm to third parties. In those rare instances when media outlets have been liable for content, the
court has focused on one or more of the following three issues: incitement (unlawful speech that

41
15

Moore, supra note 1.
Id.
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results in immediate harmful activity), foreseeablity (speech that has the potential for harm), and
speech (the constitutionally‐protected right to voice opinions and ideas).
In Schenck v. U.S.43, the Court determined that speech may not be regulated unless it
poses a clear and present danger to society.44 In Schenck, the defendant mailed circulars during
World War I to draftees suggesting the draft was abhorrently wrong because it was motivated by
the capitalist system.

The circulars encouraged draftees not to submit to intimidation and

advised peaceful petitioning to show their dissidence. Schenck was charged with violating the
Espionage Act for his attempts to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct
recruitment.45 Schenck claimed that his activity was protected under the first amendment; he was
simply advocating a political position. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Schenck was
not protected because of the nature of the circumstances surrounding his acts. During wartime,
utterances tolerable in peacetime may be punished. Finding that Schenck’s activities posed a clear
and present danger to society, the court upheld Schenck’s conviction:

“It is a question of

proximity and degree…If the act (speaking or circulating a paper), its tendency and the intent
with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants
making the act a crime.” 46 The decision in Schenck laid the foundation for future constitutional
protections for speech.
Six years later, the Court revisited the free speech issue and appeared to retreat from the
clear and present danger standard. In Gitlow v. New York47, the Supreme Court ruled that a state
government can forbid speech and publication if the speech in question has a tendency to result
in action dangerous to public security, even though these utterances create no clear and present
danger. In this instance, Gitlow—a socialist—was arrested for handing out copies of a left‐wing
manifesto that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any
form. Gitlow was subsequently convicted of violating New York’s criminal anarchy law, which
punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. Significantly, the Court held
43
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that the First Amendment (through the Fourteenth Amendment) does apply to the states. A state
may forbid both speech and publication if they have a tendency to result in dangerous actions
that threaten public security. According to the Court, individual states have the authority to
punish certain unreasonable speech even if that speech creates no danger whatsoever. Gitlow
also illustrates the Court’s willingness to deny constitutional protection for speech that urges
people to act in an inherently dangerous manner, even statements that are not directed to a
specific person or group of people.48
In

Near v. Minnesota49,

the Court relied upon the Gitlow extension of the First

Amendment free speech rights to states to determine that the protection of speech against prior
restraint was at the heart of the First Amendment. The Court’s rationale revolves around the fact
that Jay Near published a “scandal sheet” in which he attacked local Minneapolis officials. Near
charged that certain members of the government had gangster associations. Minneapolis state
law laid forth that any person “engaged in the business” of regularly publishing or circulating an
“obscene, lewd, and lascivious” or a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” newspaper or
periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be prohibited from committing or maintaining the
nuisance.

Therefore, officials obtained an injunction to stop Near from publishing his

newspaper. The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court held the Minnesota
government’s actions to be constitutionally invalid. With this decision, the Court established as a
constitutional principle the notion that, with a few narrow exceptions, the government could not
censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be
punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding.
Subsequent cases such as Dennis v. U.S.50

forced the Court to realize the idea of

incitement is not a simple as cause and effect. As the Court noted in Dennis, the probability of
success is not a determining factor in the restriction of speech. In this case, the leaders of the
Communist Party of America were arrested and charged with violating certain aspects of the
Smith Act, which made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow
or destruction of the U.S. government. The Supreme Court found that the Smith Act did not
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inherently violate the First Amendment; therefore, the Court upheld the convictions. With its
decision, the Court held that there is a distinct difference between the mere teaching of
communist philosophies and active advocacy, which constituted a clear and present danger that
threatened the government. Therefore, Dennis provided an added component to the notion of
incitement—speech without action—and raised an interesting question: Can speech that does
not result in action be restricted? In the Court’s opinion, the answer is “Yes.” The Court held a
distinction between mere teaching and advocacy, citing advocating speech as more possessing
the potential for more dire consequences.51 Through these cases of Brandenburg, Schenck, and
Dennis, the Court set forth the notion of labeling inciting speech as unprotected speech.
These cases exemplify the court system’s aggressive defense of highly‐valued political
commentary. However, there exist rare legal exceptions that allow courts the power to limit
certain low‐value speech such as harmful speech. This notion of punishing speech that can incite
harm is grounded securely in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brandenburg v. Ohio52. In this case,
the Supreme Court ruled speech that incites immediate lawless action is unprotected and
therefore punishable. This ruling came about because Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader,
made a threatening speech at a Klan rally.

Because of the existence of an Ohio criminal

sydicalism law, Brandenburg was convicted of advocating “crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform,ʺ as
well as assembling “with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or
advocate the doctrines of criminal sydicalism.”

The Court ruled the Ohio law to be

unconstitutional because it violated Brandenburg’s free speech rights. With its ruling, the Court
developed an incitement test that breaks down into the following elements: (1) Advocacy that is
directed to incite or produce; (2) imminent lawless conduct; (3) and the likelihood that such
action will result.53 The Supreme Court’s notion of incitement is the proposed starting point in
forming an analysis for potentially unprotected speech, such as the speech of pedophiles.
In the wake of Brandenburg, the federal judiciary has placed an increasingly high value on
freedom of expression and its significance to the cultivation of the marketplace of ideas, as
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exemplified in the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.54
According to the Court’s decision in Landmark, the major purpose of the First Amendment is to
protect free discussion, specifically in regards to holding government and public officials up to
scrutiny through the media. Before this ruling, a Virginia statute made it a crime to divulge
information regarding proceedings before a state judicial review commission that is authorized to
hear complaints about judges’ disability or misconduct. The appellant publisher printed in its
newspaper an article accurately reporting on a pending inquiry by the commission and
identifying the judge whose conduct was being investigated. Consequently, the publisher was
convicted of violating the state statute. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld this conviction.
However, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, injury to the reputation of judges or the
institutional reputation of courts is not sufficient to justify repressing speech that would
otherwise be free. Therefore, the clear and present danger principle does not apply in situations
like this because a media report or critique of the judgment of public officials, such as out‐of‐
court comments on pending cases or grand jury investigations, does not hamper the
administration of justice.

APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PERSONAL INJURY (TORT)
LAW
The previously cited cases all involved the Court’s review of a state actors’ infringement
of constitutionally protected speech. The phrase “Congress shall make no laws…” traditionally
implied that the Constitution could only be implicated when Congress (or a state, following the
incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment) acted to quash speech. In New York Times v.
Sullivan,55 however, the Court applied constitutional scrutiny to a civil lawsuit between private
parties. Sullivan involved a full‐page advertisement in the New York Times which alleged that the
arrest of civil rights leaders in Alabama was part of a concerted effort by the state to discourage
blacks from voting. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel lawsuit against the
paper and the endorsers of the ad, claiming the allegations defamed him personally. The Court
held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about
the conduct of public officials except when the statements are made with actual malice or
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knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard for the truth.56 According to the Court, public officials
must prove actual malice in order to recover for defamation. The requirement shields citizens
from liability for criticizing government officials.
Sullivan marked one of the first times that the Constitution was used to protect a party in
a civil action. The Court addressed the issue summarily in Sullivan, quickly dismissing the
Alabama State Supreme Court’s assertion that “the Fourteenth Amendment is directed against
State action and not against private action” without citing a single case as precedent.57 The
Supreme Court found that Constitutional protections prevented a private party from using state
law to silence another private party. The law in Sullivan was a civil statute, not a criminal
provision. The Court noted that “the test is not the form which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.”58 The prospect of a crippling
award for damages can serve to silence speech more effectively than a misdemeanor criminal
statute, according to the Court.59 The Constitutional protection afforded to speech demands that
courts guard against any device used to silence speech, including civil and criminal statutes.
Sullivan’s progeny strengthened the Court’s resolve to protect speech from civil liability.
In the case of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,60 the Court decided to extend the rule in NY
Times v. Sullivan to public figures. The shield allowing private citizens the right to criticize their
elected officials was extended to criticism of “public figures.” In Gertz v. Welch,61 the Court
clarified its definition of public figures, including people that “voluntarily thrust themselves into
the public eye.”62 Gertz also required plaintiffs to show some level of fault, amounting to at least
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negligence, before recovering in defamation.63 Speakers were granted more immunity from
liability as the Court extended Constitutional protection to private individuals suing other
private individuals. In a series of cases between 1967 and 1989, the Court repeatedly applied the
Constitution to shield the media from liability to shield the media from liability for a variety of
torts, including invasion of privacy. In Time v. Hill,64 the Court held that the First Amendment
protects the media from liability for false light invasion of privacy for portraying plaintiffs
involved in matters of public interest. In Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn,65 the Court ruled that the
First Amendment protects media outlets from state privacy laws that place an undue burden on
the press. In Florida Star v. BJF,66 the Court held that the Constitution protected a newspaper that
printed personal information about a rape victim. Because the paper obtained the information
lawfully, the Constitution protected the paper from liability. In Hustler v. Fallwell,67 the Court
held that the Constitution prevented public figures from recovering for liability for infliction of
emotional distress unless the public figures could show actual malice. NAMBLA is using a
similar argument to protect its speech. Because the Curleys are using a state law to punish
NAMBLA’s speech, the Constitution provides some protection for NAMBLA.
A number of cases support at least a part of NAMBLA’s argument. Courts are loathe to
restrict speech that does not possess a reasonable foreseeability to cause harm. In the case of
Olivia N. v. NBC,68 a California court held as constitutionally protected a television broadcast of
the rape of a young girl. As evidence by this decision, the courts are extremely hesitant to apply
the label of “unprotected” to any speech, broadcast, or publication that does not encourage or
advocate any acts of violence and does not constitute an incitement to commit a crime. Most
lawsuits of this nature involve claims that certain media companies are negligent in the
production or distribution of a product that has caused someone to commit a violent act.
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Another similar case is Zamora v. CBS,69 which saw the plaintiffs sue CBS, ABC, and NBC for
negligently causing their son to become involuntarily addicted to television violence, which
caused the son to murder their neighbor. Using the same rationale as the court’s decision in
Olivia N., the action in the Zamora case was dismissed on First Amendment grounds. Likewise, in
Walt Disney Productions v. Shannon,70 the Georgia Supreme Court applied the clear and present
danger test from Schenck and affirmed a grant of summary judgment for Walt Disney after a child
injured himself when reenacting a sound effect technique shown on Disney’s The Mickey Mouse
Club. Subsequent decisions in DeFillippo v. NBC71 and McCollum v. CBS72 follow the pattern of
courts refusing to hold media outlets liable for ensuing violence. In DeFillipo, the court held as
constitutionally protected a broadcast that resulted in the death of a young boy who was
imitating a dangerous television stunt, and the McCollum court found the Ozzy Osbourne song
“Suicide Solution,” which exhorted suicide, as not actionable.
This First Amendment protection is not relegated to broadcasts—it also extends to
publications. In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,73 a Fifth Circuit court held that publication of the
description of techniques likely to cause harm is protected under the First Amendment as long as
they serve an educational purpose. This case involved a 14‐year‐old boy who hung himself in the
process of replicating the practice of “auto‐erotic asphyxia,” an act he read about in Hustler
Magazine. In its opinion, the court stated that even though protecting children is an important
societal goal, that concern should be weighed against “the danger that unclear or diminished
standards of the First Amendment protections may both inhibit the expression of protected ideas
by other speakers and constrict the right of the public to receive those ideas.”74 According to this
decision, the court admits the fact that while dangerous materials are readily available
throughout the media, the notion of “dangerous ideas” are open to interpretation and difficult to
pin point. With these decisions, the courts have concluded that a media broadcast such as a film
does not fall within the scope of speech which is unprotected by the Constitution. Therefore, in
most cases, the courts are of the opinion that media companies are protected from civil liability
for damages allegedly caused by a publication or a broadcast.
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However, a case that can be categorized as somewhat of an exception to this rationale is
Byers v. Edmondson.75 In this instance, a convenience store clerk was shot and paralyzed by two
teenagers who went on a crime spree allegedly after repeated viewings of Oliver Stone’s film
Natural Born Killers. The plaintiffs argued that Time Warner and Stone were liable for making
and distributing such a film which they should have known would inspire people to commit
similar crimes as portrayed in the film. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the Louisiana
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings, finding that the defendants’
conduct was not protected by the First Amendment if the plaintiffs could prove the defendants
intended to assist and facilitate criminal conduct by urging viewers to imitate the criminal
conduct of the main characters in the film. The court noted that evidence of such intent would be
difficult to prove, and that this case may illustrate greater tolerance by some courts to entertain
suits that previously would have been dismissed on First Amendment grounds. Consequently,
both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court refused to review the
reversal of summary judgment for the defendants. However, on remand, the judge in the trial
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Louisiana Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment, saying the movie did not incite the shooter and her boyfriend to go on a
crime rampage.
Therefore, under certain circumstances, the media are not completely and utterly
unrestricted in the speech they present.

According to the courts, the media and similar

organizations can be held liable for certain foreseeable harm that comes about as a result of any
publication or broadcast. Aside from the notion of incitement, this Thesis will analyze other court
rulings and opinions regarding the legal ideas of aiding and abetting and foreseeability—in other
words, speech that facilitates harm or speech that has a foreseeable potential for danger attached
to it. If so, the speech is punishable.
Perhaps the most notable case involving media or organizational liability is Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises, Inc.76 This case revolves around the question of whether the producers of a
publication—in this instance, a book detailing explicit instructions on how to kill people and get
away with it—can be held liable for any harm that comes about as a result of their printed
speech. In regards to Paladin, the Fourth Circuit appeals court ruled “Yes,” holding that the
75
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information in the book could and did fall outside the realm of protected speech. Here, the
speech in question was not aimed at a specific person nor did it target a specific victim. Yet the
Fourth Circuit still ruled that Hitman was tantamount to incitement because the book “consisted
of ‘the teachings of methods of terror,’ and therefore [is] the absolute ‘antithesis of speech
protected under Brandenburg.”77 Here the Fourth Circuit set forth a precedent that creates the
possibility of extending liability to those whose speech is a contributing factor in facilitating a
non‐specific, non‐immediate harm.

With this decision, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the

information contained in Hitman is equitable to the crime of aiding and abetting because “this
book constitutes the archetypal example of speech which, because it methodically and
comprehensively prepares and steels its audience to specific criminal conduct through
exhaustively detailed instructions on the planning, commission, and concealment of criminal
conduct, finds no preserve in the First Amendment.”78
The case of Weirum v. RKO79 subscribes to a similar notion of negligence. In this instance
the California Supreme Court decided that a radio DJ exhorting driving directions to teenagers
created a reasonable probability that danger and harm could occur. In essence, the ruling court
held the DJ and the radio station responsible because the DJ issued repeated live exhortations to
listeners urging them to act in an inherently dangerous manner, and the foreseeablity of such
dangerous action on the part of the listeners was high. Similar to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Paladin, the California Supreme Court determined with Weirum that its decision to hold the radio
station accountable for the harm is based on the premise of incitement of a live audience to
imminent lawless and harmful action.
Another case involving foreseeablity and the notion of incitement is Braun v. Soldier of
Fortune Magazine80. In this instance, a magazine published an advertisement calling for a “gun for
hire.” Responding to the advertisement, a hired mercenary gunned down another man outside
his home and the magazine was charged with criminal conspiracy.

The magazine used

Brandenburg and the First Amendment to make its case, but the Eleventh Circuit court rejected the
defense’s claim and held the magazine to be liable on the basis of a foreseeable danger that could,
and in this case did, occur.

With Braun, the precedent was set that allows the negligent
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publication of malicious speech to be punished.

According to the Eleventh Circuit, this

punishment of speech is constitutional based on the fact that speech has a reasonable
foreseeability to cause harm. The court ruled the language of the ad to be sinister in nature, even
though the threat was couched in terms that were non‐explicit. With this decision, the courts
installed a legal base of responsibility within the media so that journalists, activists, broadcasters,
private organizations, etc., can be held liable for any speech that can be reasonably considered
harmful or has the power to incite harm.

LITERATURE REVIEW
In regards to the potentially harmful nature of pedophilic speech, the existing legal
literature and research is split on this issue of limiting such controversial speech. Some scholars
favor limiting certain kinds of “borderland speech”—questionable speech that has not been
addressed specifically by the courts—while others champion the free speech rights of every
person regardless of the content or nature of that speech. These champions of free speech
provide a compelling argument, fearing any legal condemnation of speech provides a slippery
slope that compromises the marketplace of ideas, thereby threatening the very fabric of the
Constitution.81 However, other scholars feel as though the permission of any speech regardless of
content is simply anarchy, and the courts have a responsibility to the people to limit certain
speech in order to maintain a working, civil, and livable society.82
Amy Adler, with her article The Perverse Law of Child Pornography,83 compares regulating
certain speech to “opening a Pandora’s Box” of censorship that society is ill‐prepared to handle.
She contends that by regulating things like child pornography, lawmakers may “produce
80
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perverse, unintended consequences,” and that the ensuing legal battle may have unrecognized
costs. Ultimately, her contention is the more regulation society imposes the more harm is caused.
Likewise, in his article Rethinking Harm and Pornography: Conflicting Personal and Community
Views84, Mark Silver argues that an “individual in a free society may only be deemed free if they
can participate unencumbered in behaviors that may, indeed, be harmful.”

And as far as

obscenity goes, according to Silver, the lawmaker gets more satisfaction from making the laws
than the man who is making love.85 Basically, according to Silver, the pleasure of regulation is
more powerful to some people than the pleasure of love, and regulation on any expressive
activity is tantamount to a restriction on a person’s freedom of choice. Silver and other scholars
equate any regulation of speech with censorship, and contend that the marketplace of ideas is the
ultimate judge of society’s speech.
Others believe that regulation is the only way to impede the harm caused by destructive
speech. In his article, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and the
Borderland of the Brandenburg Test,86 legal scholar David Crump suggests limiting the inciting
speech by applying his notion of camouflaged incitement. This notion involves two aspects:
coded speech and inducement by “recipes” for violence and advocacy by attractive presentation
or urging. Simply put, coded speech takes place when a speaker simply substitutes a coded, or
implied, statement of the activity that is sought to be induced.87 Inducement by recipes for
violence and advocacy by attractive presentation or urging is advocacy that supplies otherwise
missing information needed to commit a crime, provides a roadmap to the actors, or simply
couples description with details that amount to instructions.88
Tiffany Komasara also recommends analyzing questionable speech by relaxing the
current imminence standard that was put forth with the Brandenburg case. As stated earlier, the
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Brandenburg test breaks down into three elements: (1) advocacy that is directed to incite or
produce; (2) imminent lawless conduct; (3) and the likelihood that such action will result.
According to Komasara argues that the third element of Brandenburg is indisputably met where
civil liability is imposed after harm has resulted. She contends the first element revolves around
determining the intent of the sender, because
“evaluation is necessary to avoid imposing liability on speech that should remain
protected. The first element of Brandenburg is necessary to separate speech that is ‘mere
advocacy’ from speech that ‘prepares a group for violent action and steels it to such
action.’”89
Komasara contends that the second element—that the requirement that action be imminent—
creates a major obstacle for imposing liability in questionable incitement cases, such as the one
involving NAMBLA. Her idea is to relax Brandenburg’s imminence requirement in situations of
delayed incitement cases. Komasara argues that the current Brandenburg standard requires that
incitement must imminent, not just the ‘mere abstract teaching’ of ways to commit crimes.90 She
contends that relaxing the imminence standard takes into consideration the content of the
message, the intent of the sender, and the likelihood that the communication will result in harm.
She claims that by implementing this standard, “mere abstract teachings” would still be allowed,
and that those who speak of violence will “think twice” before releasing their speech because of
the courts balancing their interests against the interest of potential victims.91
Komasara is quick to question whether her notion of relaxing the imminence requirement
could “hinder the ideals that the First Amendment set out to protect, and that Brandenburg has
upheld.” However, she refers to Paladin Justice Luttig’s opinion that this notion does not have
that effect: “Luttig systematically refutes the claims put forth by the defendant that imposing
liability on a book publisher will have chilling effects on free speech and will jeopardize the
future of all forms of media.” Komasara goes on to contend that media will remain unhindered
by the court’s decision, which relied on the publisher’s intent.
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David Crump’s camouflaged incitement perspective may be another doctrine with which
to begin unraveling the idea of what is protected and unprotected speech. But because his notion
is developed “on the well‐conceived test laid down in Brandenburg,” this idea of camouflaged
incitement is relevant to this issue:
“[This doctrine is] straightforward to apply, and it can be expected to give as
sound results as any constitutional test in so murky an area. This approach
would identify serious cases of camouflaged incitement to violence and murder,
and yet it would protect the freedom of speech as fully as the Supreme Court has
protected it in contexts of less serious risk.”92
Crump’s ideas may provide a starting point by which pedophilic speech can be interpreted as
dangerous speech that has the potential to be restricted.

However, his doctrine does not

specifically address pedophilic speech, and the question still remains as to whether pedophilic
speech can be categorized as “camouflaged speech” or incitement.
Although Crump and Komasara have addressed the topic of constitutionally limiting
questionable speech, neither applied their notions to the speech of pedophiles. Pedophilic speech
has been researched, but most scholars seem to pick an “either/or” mentality to this delicate topic.
Some scholars champion the free speech rights of all men—regardless of the consequences of that
speech—while others believe that certain individual rights are a small sacrifice for the protection
of society.93 Consequently, this Thesis fills a gap in the literature by addressing this pressing
issue. By examining Crump’s “camouflaged speech” and Komasara’s “relaxing of the imminence
standard,” the Author hopes to address the legality of certain pedophilic speech.

METHOD
Moral and legal constraints prevent this Thesis from obtaining complete access to all of
NAMBLAʹs publications.

Basic, non‐threatening organizational information is presented on

NAMBLA’s website, but access to publications like the NAMBLA Bulletin, “The Survival
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Manual,” and “Rape and Escape” are available only to those NAMBLA members who pay a
membership fee. However, information from these restricted publications is available through
court documents and online articles like those presented on www.WorldNetDaily.com.
With this available information, as well as through a careful analysis of court opinions
and legal research, this Thesis will investigate all facets of the free speech notions of incitement,
foreseeablity, and aiding and abetting. Gaining access to these documents through LexisNexis
and other academic search engines, this research will provide an overview of the existing rulings,
opinions, and legal theories in order to take a step forward in determining if pedophilic speech
falls into a specified unprotected category. The research applied to this Thesis is a law‐based
research; therefore, this research will employ a legal content analysis in order to arrive at the
desired results.
Using the legal foundation set forth with cases ranging from Schenck to Paladin, this
Thesis will examine the opinions and rulings of federal and state courts involving limiting and
punishing speech. After tracing the legal development of free speech, this Thesis will review and
apply the necessary court rulings as well as research and findings of numerous legal scholars to
determine if there is a constitutionally protected means by which the courts can punish
pedophilic speech that facilitates harm. As a result, this study of the First Amendment will more
clearly define the Constitution by illuminating the murky nature of pedophilic speech that
facilitates harm in regards to its status under the First Amendment. Courts have ruled that
reasonable limits on speech can be justified in a free and democratic society. But the issue
remains unresolved as to whether speech can be constitutionally restricted without infringing on
the First Amendment. More specifically, this thesis will develop a standard that can determine
whether pedophilic speech that facilitates harm falls within or outside of that category of
protected speech.
Although this study is based on the questionable free speech rights of pedophiles, the
basis for this study is the notion of incitement. Can pedophilic speech such as in the case
involving NAMBLA and the Curleys be regarded as incitement under the Brandenburg test? Can
the courts hold pedophile and pedophile organizations responsible for the harmful effects that
their speech may bring about? Through this study, this Thesis will attempt to answer these and
any related questions regarding the culpability of speech that has the potential to cause damage.
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Although the core research will be based on court rulings and legal theories, the results
of this study will be tested by applying the findings to an ongoing case: Barbara and Robert Curley
v. The North American Man/Boy Love Association, et al. With this case as the backdrop, this Thesis
will begin by analyzing various cases and legal doctrines regarding to the constitutionality of
potentially harmful speech. By relying on the sources used in this ongoing case as well as
independent research, this Thesis will be able to apply the necessary and relevant court cases and
legal theories to develop a self‐sufficient, fully‐functioning legal theory that could possibly be
applied to this case and to future cases involving similar circumstances. This theory will be
tested by applying its tenets to previously decided cases.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLUTION OF SPEECH LIABILITY

For years the United States court system has wrestled with the constitutional notions of
what is and what is not allowable in regards to speech, expression, and action. The idea of
punishable speech began to become an issue with the United States Supreme Court around the
time of World War I, and in the years following World War II a number of cases were brought
before the Supreme Court that forced the Court to alter and update its previous notions of
punishable speech.

FREE SPEECH AND THE INCITEMENT STANDARD
With the advent of World War I, governmental authorities sought to punish anyone who
advocated a violent overthrow of the United States government. The Espionage Act of 1917
criminalized willfully making or conveying false reports or statements with intent to interfere
with the prosecution of war or promote the success of enemies during wartimes.94 Title 12 of the
Espionage Act, which sought to punish the willful causing of disaffection from military and
obstruction of recruitment, declared material that violates provisions of the act to be
“unmailable.” Relying on his authority under Title 12, the New York Postmaster declared the
anti‐war magazine The Masses to be nonmailable. The publisher sought to enjoin the Postmaster
from refusing to mail the publication.
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In Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,95 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the publisher, and
Justice Learned Hand held the publication was not punishable under the statute because it was
abstract advocacy and not a direct call for illegal activity. According to Hand’s rationale, the
actor would have to had used specific triggers to action: “If one stops short of urging upon
others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held
to have attempted to cause its violation.”96
Hand formulated that words can be punished if they “counsel or advise others to violate
the law as it stands,” but not if they are only critical of the law. This “Hand Formulation”
focused solely on the actual words that are spoken rather than the circumstances surrounding the
speech. Under this test, the consequences of the speech are deemed irrelevant.
Two years later, with Schenck v. US, 97 the Court’s clear and present danger rationale was
established. The Court concluded any speech could be punished if that speech posed a clear and
present danger to society. Schenck is an important decision because it provides a standard for
determining when the courts can legally and constitutionally regulate speech.98 In this case, the
Court ruled that speech could be punished if it created a clear and present danger that an illegal
act would come about as a result of that speech. The circumstances of Schenck’s conviction
involved his mailing anti‐war pamphlets to draftees during World War I.

Through these

pamphlets, Schenck made the contention that the draft was a calamitous political maneuver that
was being perpetrated by the government for capital gain.99
The pamphlets urged that draftees “do not submit to intimidation” and advocated the
use of peaceful forms of protest such as petitions to oppose the draft.100 Authorities charged
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Schenck with conspiring to violate the Espionage Act101 by attempting to cause insubordination in
the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck appealed the conviction for printing and
circulating the pamphlet which advocated that people resist the draft. In the pamphlets, Schenck
“accused Wall Street of creating the despotism of conscription, assailing cunning politicians and a
mercenary capitalist press, and urged citizens to exercise ‘your right to assert your opposition to
the draft.’”102
Although Schenck claimed that his actions, words, and expression were protected by the
First Amendment as free speech, the Court unanimously affirmed Schenck’s conviction.
Concluding that Schenck was not protected in this situation, the Court cited the prevention of a
violent overthrow of the government as the government’s compelling interest in restricting the
defendant’s speech.
circumstances.

According to the Court, the character of every act depends on the

The Court found that Schenck’s intended goal was to influence listeners to

obstruct the draft:
“Words of which, ordinarily and in many places, would be within the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment, may become subject to prohibition
when of such a nature and used in such circumstances as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress
has a right to prevent.

The character of every act depends upon the

circumstances in which it is done.”103
In the Court’s view, the defendant’s words had the intent and the potential to create a clear
and present danger; therefore, the Court has a duty to regulate harmful utterances that
possess little communicative value.104 The Court’s rationale in this case is that the effect or
potential effect of the speech in question deserves more importance than the message
involved:
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“…the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic…It is a question of
proximity and degree…If the act (speaking or circulating a paper), its tendency
and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for
saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.”105
Following in the footsteps of Schenck, the Court ruled in Gitlow v. NY106 that the clear and
present danger test was not applicable in circumstances where Congress already had forbade
certain speech.

During this period, the Criminal Anarchy statute banned advocating the

overthrow of the government by violence and force.

Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested for

distributing copies of a left‐wing manifesto that urged the establishment of socialism through
strikes and any form of class action. On appeal, Gitlow’s contention was that no action came
about as a result of his publication. He also argued that the statute unconstitutionally penalized
speech that did not incite dangerous results.
The Court disagreed, however, and held that individual states have the authority to
prohibit speech and publication if the state feels as though the speech or publication in question
has the potential to result in actions that pose a threat to public security, even though such
utterances create no clear and present danger:
“Freedom of speech and of the press, as secured by the Constitution, is not an
absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may
choose or an immunity for every possible use of language…That a state in the
exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by
utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite
to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question.” 107
In essence, the Court was distinguishing between speech that furthers discussion and
speech that has the potential to incite violent conduct. Here, the intent of the Court was not to
penalize speech that promotes an abstract doctrine that was not designed to cause concrete
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action; instead, the Court was limiting speech that uses the “language of direct incitement.”108 In
this instance, the Court ruled that Gitlow’s manifesto went beyond mere advocacy of an abstract
doctrine. Consequently, the Court held Gitlow’s utterances that advocated an overthrow of the
government by unlawful means to be a “sufficient danger of substantive evil.”109
Based on this decision, the Court gave lawmakers to authority to decide that an entire
class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited. Those legislative decisions would
retain constitutional protection if they were not unreasonable, and the defendant will be
punished even if the speech created no danger at all:

“A state may punish publications

advocating and encouraging a breach of its criminal laws.”110
In the post‐World War II era, the Communist threat prompted Congress to pass certain
laws designed to protect the United States government from a potential overthrow at the hands
of the Communist Party. In 1948, the leaders of the Communist Party of America were arrested
and charged with violating provisions of the Smith Act, which made it unlawful to knowingly
conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government.111
Party leaders were found guilty of conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the US government
and conspiring to reorganize the Communist Party of the United States.
In Dennis v. US,112 the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party
leaders and found that the Smith Act did not inherently violate the First Amendment, holding
that there was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active
advocacy of those ideas. With Dennis, the Court further solidified the notion that there exists a
distinct difference between the mere teaching of abstract doctrines and an active advocacy of
harmful actions. Here, in regards to the Smith Act, the Court ruled that because there exists a
difference between mere teaching and advocacy of action, the Act did not inherently violate the
First Amendment. Therefore, the Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party leaders,
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ruling that preparing and steeling a sufficiently sized and cohesive group to violence by
employing the language of incitement is not constitutionally protected.
The fact that the advocacy had already taken place is the essence of the Dennis judgment.
The Court was not placing a prior restraint on speech; instead, the Court was penalizing words
that had actually been uttered. According to the Court, such speech created a clear and present
danger that threatened the government. Given the gravity of the consequences of an attempted
overthrow, the Court held that the success or probability of success was not necessary to justify
restrictions on speech. In the words of the Court:
“…making it a crime for any person knowingly or willfully to advocate the
overthrow or destruction of the government of the United States b force or
violence, to organize or help to organize any group which does so, or to conspire
to do so, do not violate the First Amendment or other provisions of the Bill of
Rights and do not violate the First or Fifth Amendments because of
indefiniteness.”113
In Dennis the Court did not hesitate to punish a certain type of speech that it felt
possessed a tremendous potential to cause harm. However, in Yates v. United States, 114 the Court
ruled definitively that a mere advocacy of an abstract doctrine is unpunishable under the First
Amendment. Once again, the issue in this case involved the Communist Party teaching and
advocating the forceful overthrow of the government. As in Dennis, the Court drew a distinction
between the advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle and the
advocacy and teaching of concrete action for a forcible overthrow of the government. However,
in this instance, the Court ruled in favor of the Communist Party, ruling that “the distinction
between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action is
one that has been consistently recognized in the opinions of this court.”

115

Because of that

distinction, the Court recognized that instances of speech that amounted to advocacy of action
(such as in Dennis) were few and far between, and that the mere teaching of abstract doctrines is
constitutionally protected speech.
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Even though the Court established the unconstitutionality of speech that advocates
harmful action in cases like Schenck and Dennis, it wasn’t until Scales v. United States116 that the
Court extended its definition of unprotected speech to any speech that facilitated harm. In Scales,
the Court upheld the conviction of Junius Scales based on his membership status in the
Communist Party.

117

The Court noted that Scales at the very least knew, encouraged, and

provoked illegal party activities over the course of his 8‐year membership; therefore, he was
guilty under the Smith Act of complicity in the commission of criminal activity.118 In supporting
Scales’ conviction, the Court noted:
“In this instance it is an organization which engages in criminal activity, and we
can perceive no reason why one who actively and knowingly works in the ranks
of that organization, intending to contribute to the success of those specifically
illegal activities, should be anymore immune from prosecution than he to whom
the organization has assigned the task of carrying out the substantive criminal
act.”119
With this decision, the Court ruled that there was no difference between speech that was
active advocacy that has the potential to produce imminent harm, and speech that does not
produce imminent harm but rather advocated violence in a fashion that directly facilitates the
realization of harm.120
A companion case to Scales, Noto v. United States121 involved the defendant’s conviction
for violating the membership clause of the Smith Act, criminalized the acquisition or holding of
membership in any organization advocating the overthrow of the government by force or
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violence. The Supreme Court reversed this conviction, ruling that the evidence advanced at the
trial was insufficient to show that the Communist Party, of which Noto was a member, engaged
in advocacy of action.

The Court held that the mere abstract teaching is not the same as

preparing a group for violent action (as was the case in Noto).
According to the Court, an active member who has guilty knowledge of a violent group’s
intent to engage in certain harmful action may be prosecuted. However, in the case of Noto,
when the defendant is a member of a group that advocates only an abstract doctrine, the speech
involved in an instance such as this is unpunishable because there is no language of incitement at
play.122
Although the Court addressed language of incitement in the previous cases, the Court
didn’t develop a specific incitement test until Brandenburg v. Ohio. 123 With this case, the Court
crafted a modern restatement of its clear and present danger by ruling that the only speech that
can be punished or suppressed is the speech which incited imminent lawless action. The clear
and present danger test evolved into the Brandenburg test to determine whether the government
can prohibit specific kinds of speech. Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was convicted under
the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute for his actions during an organized Klan rally.. Although
only a dozen or so hooded and armed Klansmen attended the so‐called meeting, Brandenburg
lashed out with racist remarks toward Jews and blacks. He also made the following remark:
“This is an organizers’ meeting. We have had quite a few members here today
which are—we have hundreds, hundreds of members throughout the state of
Ohio.

I can quote from a newspaper clipping from the Columbus, Ohio

Dispatch, five weeks ago Sunday morning. The Klan has more members in the
state of Ohio than does any other organization.

We’re not a revengent

organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues
to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be
some revengeance taken. We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four
hundred thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two groups, one
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group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into
Mississippi. Thank you.”124
Brandenburg was convicted under the Ohio criminal syndicalism law, which made
illegal the advocating of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means
of accomplishing industrial or political reform, as well as assembling with any society, group, or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines f criminal syndicalism.
The Court overturned the conviction, ruling that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg’s
right to free speech:
“As we said in Noto v. US, ‘the mere abstract teaching…of the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.’ A statute
which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
condemnation

speech

which

our

Constitution

has

It sweeps within its
immunized

from

governmental control.”125
With this decision, the Court crystallized a specific, step‐by‐step standard by which the
nature of the speech in question could be determined. In order for speech to be labeled as the
language of incitement, the government must prove the speech is (1) directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action (the Learned Hand Test), and (2) is likely to produce such
action (clear and present danger). 126 This test varied from previous clear and present danger
standards in that it provided specific requirements that, if met, would hold the speaker
responsible for the immediately harmful results of his speech. 127
With its decisions from Masses to Brandenburg, the Court dealt specifically with speech
that was spoken with the intent to cause harm. However, as later courts found out, speech
doesn’t need to be intentional in order to cause harm. Borrowing from the notion of incitement,
courts developed the concept of negligence/foreseeability. Under this concept, a person can
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constitutionally be held responsible for the harmful effects of ignoring his duty to prevent harm
and to warn others to the potential of harm.

However, unlike incitement, the concepts of

negligence/foreseeability do not require that the harmful results of speech be intentional. Instead
the essence of this negligence/foreseeability concept is based on the fact that the harm was
avoidable, and the failure to foresee possible harm could result in negligence being assigned to a
private person or entity.

SPEECH LIABILITY THROUGH NEGLIGENCE/FORESEEABILITY
According to California’s Civil Code, “…all persons are liable for injuries caused by
failure to exercise due care.”128

With Rowland v. Christian,129 the California Supreme Court

followed this rationale as it set forth the “Rowland Factors,” which involved the fundamental
principle of balancing a number of considerations in regards to determining negligence. In this
case, the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant’s apartment. The plaintiff asked to use the
bathroom and subsequently suffered an injury when a cracked handle on the toilet basin broke
and severed tendons and nerves on the plaintiff’s hand. The defendant knew of the problem but
failed to alert the plaintiff to the potential for injury as a result of the defect. The plaintiff argued
that the host breached a duty that a reasonable and prudent person would exercise in a similar
situation, and that the defendant failed to warn of a known dangerous condition.130 The court
agreed, holding that negligence applies in this case because a person can be held liable for
injuries caused by his/her carelessness or for a breach of duty. According to the court, the failure
to warn a guest of a potentially dangerous situation is to subject that person to an unreasonable
risk of harm when the guest is aware of the potential danger. The court’s factors, which were set
forth to determine a person’s duty of care, are as follows:
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐

The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.
The degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury.
The closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered.
The moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct.
The policy of preventing future harm.
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‐
‐

The extent of the burden of the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.
The availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for risk involved.131

Although this is not a media case, the California Court did begin laying the groundwork
for a step‐by‐step standard by which courts can determine liability in cases involving negligence.
California courts are among the most influential in the nation, and other courts frequently follow
the decisions and precedents that the California courts set forth. Therefore, Rowland is relevant to
this study because of the establishment of definitive factors that can determine a person’s duty of
care.
This duty of care rationale was advanced by the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling in
Scheible v. Hillis.132 In this case, the plaintiff was shot while in the defendant’s residence by a third
party using a gun owned by the defendant. According to the Missouri Court, the defendant had
full knowledge of the prior mischevious, wanton, and brutal acts of the third party and
deliberately kept a loaded gun in her possession, kept the gun in an obvious location to the third
party, and notified the third party of the existence of the gun. The Court was of the opinion that
the defendant should have known of the third party’s potential actions and should have warned
the plaintiff to the existence of potential danger.
The Court here based its decision on the circumstances surrounding the harm, altering
Rowland’s ‘”duty of care” rationale into a more specific “duty to warn.” According to the court,
“negligence depends upon the surrounding circumstances and the particular conduct
involved.”133 This is so because a specific “act or omission would clearly be negligent in some
circumstances” and the same act or omission “would not be negligent in others.”134
Citing the Restatement of Torts, the court concluded that certain factors should be
considered in determining if a person is required to take precautions in this situation. The factors
include “the known character, past conduct and tendencies of the person whose conduct causes
the harm, the opportunity or temptation which the circumstances may afford him for such
misconduct, together with the gravity of the harm which may result.” 135

131

Id. at 100.
Scheibel v. Hillis 531 SW 2d 285 (1976).
133
Rest. 2d Torts, Sec. 302B, comment f.
134
Id.
135
Rest. 2d Torts, Sec. 302B.
132

36

The concept of “duty to warn” set forth in Scheibel was also used by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Molsbergen v. US136—in this instance, a World War II Navy pilot who
dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki sued the government for not warning him of the
radiation hazards involved with the atomic bomb. The plaintiff claimed the government should
have alerted him to the potential hazards such a mission entailed once the government first
learned of the risks of exposure to atomic radiation.
The California Supreme Court held that “when an employer gains information about a
serious danger to which a readily identifiable former employee has been exposed in the course of
his employment, the relative cost or inconvenience of warning him is not substantial and there is
a reason to believe that the warning might be of some benefit to its recipient, the California
Supreme Court would find that a duty to warn exists.”137 Under California law, the existence of a
duty to warn an individual of dangers to which he as been or will be exposed turns largely upon
five salient factors:
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐

The nature of the relationship between the party who has knowledge of the
danger and the party who is threatened with potential injury.
The seriousness of the potential injury.
The extent to which the potential injury is a foreseeable result of the defendant’s
conduct.
The extent of the burden on the defendant of imposing a duty to warn.
The likelihood that a warning will have a practical effect.138

California courts weigh all of these factors together when determining whether a duty to warn
exists. In order to find such a duty, “each factor need not favor the plaintiff.”139
From Rowland to Molsbergen, the courts have used negligence/foreseeability in regards to
assigning liability to harmful actions. However, with Weirum v. RKO, the legal system decided
that negligence/foreseeability can also be applied to speech that causes harm. And although the
court system established these foreseeability/negligence criteria in cases involving private people,
the courts also have gone so far as to extend these responsibilities to cases involving
foreseeability/negligence in regards to the media and the potential harm that may come about as
a result of a broadcast or a publication. Weirum is one of the few cases to impose media liability
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for harm (outside of defamation and privacy) under the negligence standard. Perhaps the most
cited media‐related physical injury case, Weirum,140 upheld a broadcaster’s liability for the
wrongful auto death caused by a youthful driver who was responding to an ill‐conceived
promotional contest.
Radio station KHJ was a successful Los Angeles, and in an attempt to attract even more
listeners and to increase advertising revenue, KHJ started a promotion called “The Summer
Spectacular.” As a part of the promotion, a popular DJ traveled to a number of locations in the
L.A. area. Periodically, he announced his current location and where he was planning on going
next on the radio. The first listener to physically locate the DJ received a cash prize.
Two different teenage drivers heard where the DJ was headed and decided to follow the
DJ’s car so that he or she would be the first person to claim the prize. For the next few miles, the
two teenage drivers jockeyed for the position closest to the DJ’s car, reaching speeds up to 80
miles per hour.
In attempting to follow the DJ, the speeding drivers forced another car to overturn. The
passenger in the overturned car died as a result of the accident. Consequently, the plaintiff
brought a wrongful death action against the radio station, and the Supreme Court of California
affirmed a jury verdict holding the radio station liable under a negligence theory for the
foreseeable results of a broadcast which created an undue risk of harm. In upholding the jury
verdict, the Court carefully limited its holding to the facts of the case, which the court described
as a “competitive scramble in which the thrill of the chase to be the one and only victor was
intensified by the live broadcasts which accompanied the pursuit.” 141
Weirum, an influential case also determined by a California court, is often cited as a case
of true incitement in the same vein as Brandenburg, a decision based on the premise of incitement
of a live audience to imminent lawless and harmful action. This interpretation highlights the fact
that the DJ’s directives were in close temporal proximity to the reckless driving that caused a
death to occur. In addition, because the DJ issued repeated live exhortations to listeners, urging
them to act in an inherently dangerous manner, the foreseeability of such action on the part of
listeners was high.
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With Weirum, the court extended Rowland’s duty of care rationale to the media, ruling
that the media are not insulated from liability for the foreseeable harm that their negligent speech
may cause. The media’s duty to foresee certain harm was further established in Hyde v. City of
Columbia.142 In this case, a Missouri Appellate Court affirmed a lower court’s ruling that a
newspaper acted negligently when the paper disclosed the name and address of an abduction
and sexual attack victim while her abductor and assailant was still at large.143 Acting on the
publication of this delicate information, the attacker made harassing, terrorizing phone calls to
the victim. The court held that because the newspaper negligently published the victim’s private
information, the paper was indeed liable for the harm that followed:

“…conduct may be negligent solely because the actor should have recognized
that it would expose the person of another to an unreasonable risk of criminal
aggression…”144
Despite the fact that Hyde involves the newspaper publishing truthful, lawfully‐obtained
information, this case is unique in that it imposed a duty of reasonable care upon the newspaper
not to not to make a rape victim’s private information available to the public while her attacker
was still at large.
However, in a case like Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,145 the Fifth Circuit overturned a jury
award against Hustler of damages for emotional and physical harm to the mother and friend of
an adolescent boy who died recreating an act he read about in a magazine article. Hustler
published an article titled “Orgasm of Death,” which described a practice known as auto‐erotic
asphyxiation. This involves masturbating while hanging one’s self to cut off the blood supply to
the brain at the moment of orgasm. The article contained a disclaimer pointing out the deadly
nature of this act. A 14‐year‐old named Troy D. read the article, ignored the warnings, and
performed the act. A friend later found Troy’s body hanging nude in his closet, a copy of the
article on the ground near the body. Troy’s mother sued Hustler on theories of negligence,
141
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attractive nuisance, product liability, and strict liability founded on dangerous instrumentality.
An appeals court found Hustler not civilly liable for the boy’s death. While the court conceded
that the magazine “paint[s] in glowing terms the pleasure supposedly achieved by the practice it
describe[s].” However, “…the Hustler article, while published in a magazine published for profit,
was not an effort to achieve a commercial result and, at least in the explicit meaning of the words
employed, attempts to dissuade its readers from conducting the dangerous activity it
describes.”146
The court went on to distinguish this case from Weirum, ruling that, unlike the radio
contest in Weirum, the Hustler article served some sort of educational purpose and did not exist
solely as a commercial, money‐making tool. In fact, the court ruled that Hustler cautioned its
readers to the danger of auto‐erotic asphyxiation, and the court cited Hustler’s repeated “attempts
to dissuade its readers from conducting the dangerous activity it describes.”147
Although the courts are wary of assigning blame to media outlets for harm that allegedly
comes about as a result of a publication or broadcast, two specific cases involving Soldier of
Fortune Magazine have shown the courts’ willingness to assign negligence‐based liability to media
outlets that publish or broadcast advertisements that have a foreseeable risk of harm. The Fifth
Circuit court in Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.148 rejected a wrongful death action
involving an advertisement referring to “high risk assignments” that ran in Soldier of Fortune
Magazine (SOF). As a result of the ad, a woman was murdered by a would‐be assassin who was
hired by her husband. A lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Fifth Circuit court
reversed the verdict, holding that SOF could only be held liable if “(1) the relation to illegal
activity appears on the ad’s face; or (2) ‘the advertisement, embroidered by its context, would
lead a reasonable publisher or ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances to
conclude that the ad could reasonably be interpreted’ as an offer to commit crimes.”149
With this decision, the Fifth Circuit held the language of the ad to be too vague and
innocuous for SOF to reasonably be able to foresee that harm could occur. The ad did not
specifically call for an assassin, and based on the context of the ad, it was not reasonable that SOF
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could determine the ad was propositioning killers. So in order not to place an undue burden on
the press, the Fifth Circuit exonerated SOF from any liability. After applying the Texas risk‐
utility balancing principle—a risk is unreasonable if it’s “of such magnitude as to outweigh what
the law regards as the utility of the defendant’s alleged negligent conduct”—the court concluded
that “the standard of conduct imposed by the district court against SOF is too high…”150 To
impose liability whenever the advertised product “could reasonably be interpreted as an offer to
engage in illegal activity” would require a publisher to reject all ambiguous ads.151
The Fifth Circuit court stated that “without a more specific indication of illegal intent
than this ad or its context provided, we conclude that SOF did not violate the required standard
of conduct by publishing an ad that later played a role in criminal activity.”152 The court held the
ad’s phrase “high risk assignments” to be too ambiguous and ruled that the risk of harm was not
sufficiently foreseeable; therefore, SOF was not responsible for the harm that occurred.
In contrast, in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,153 the Eleventh Circuit court
upheld a wrongful death claim arising out of a commercial advertisement that ran in the
magazine. As the Fifth Circuit court did in Eimann, the Eleventh Circuit court applied the risk‐
utility balancing principle in this case, holding that the publisher’s liability depends on “whether
the burden on the defendant adopting adequate precautions is less than the probability of harm
from the defendant’s unmodified conduct multiplied by the gravity of the injury that might
result from the defendant’s unmodified conduct.”
In Braun, a man named Richard Savage ran the following advertisement in Soldier of
Fortune: “GUN FOR HIRE: 37‐year‐old professional mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam Veteran.
Discreet and very private. Bodyguard, courier and other special skills. All jobs considered.”
After reading the advertisement, a man named Bruce Gastwirth hired Savage to murder
Gastwirth’s business associate, Richard Braun. Braun was gunned down outside his home in
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Atlanta, and Gastwirth and Savage were convicted of criminal conspiracy. Braun’s two sons later
filed a civil suit seeking damages for Soldier of Fortune’s involvement in their father’s murder.154
The Eleventh Circuit court reiterated the lower court’s instructions to the jury, stressing
that the jury could hold SOF liable only if the ad on its face contained a clearly identifiable risk of
harm to the public.
“We are convinced that the district court’s use of phrases like ‘clear and present
danger’ and ‘clearly identifiable unreasonable risk’ properly conveyed to the jury
that it could not impose liability on SOF if (defendant) Savage’s ad posed only an
unclear or insubstantial risk of harm to the public and if SOF would bear a
disproportionately heavy burden in avoiding the risk...” 155
In essence, the Eleventh Circuit held that the published ad created an unreasonable and
foreseeable risk of harm of potentially violent, criminal activity. The court went on to establish
that according to the “modified” negligence standard that “SOF had no legal duty to investigate
the ads it printed,” and a jury could find negligence “only if [the] advertisement ‘on its face’
would have alerted a reasonably prudent publisher that the ‘ad in question contained a clearly
identifiable risk, that the offer in the ad is one to commit a serious violent crime.’”156
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished this case from Eimann by holding the language used
in the ad to be harmful, ruling that the ad’s “combination of sinister terms ma[de] it apparent that
there was a substantial danger of harm to the public.”157 The court also took into account the
context of the speech in question. Even though no specific harmful action was referenced in the
ad, the court ruled that SOF, as a reasonable publisher, should have been able to recognize the
fact that this ad was offering services for criminal activity.158 Therefore, the lower court was
correct in holding SOF liable for the harm because the harm was foreseeable and could have been
avoided if not for the magazine’s negligent publishing of the harmful ad.
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With this case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the speech involved was a direct catalyst to
causing the violence that occurred in this instance.

According to the concept of

negligence/foreseeability that has been set forth by the courts, both private individuals and public
entities (including the media) have a legal responsibility to prevent harm, even if that harm is
unintentional. However, in cases where harm was intentional, such as in cases involving aiding
and abetting crime, the courts have ruled that speech—the spoken or written word—is not
immune from prosecution.

In the eyes of the court, any speech that aids others in the

commission of a crime is constitutionally punishable.

SPEECH LIABILITY THROUGH AIDING AND ABETTING
In US v. Buttorff,159 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for aiding
and abetting the filing of false income tax returns by giving specific instructions at a large public
gathering. The defendant cited Brandenburg in his defense, claiming his speech did not bring
about immediate lawless action. However, the court disagreed:
“It has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written,
or printed.”160
The court ruled that holding tax evasion speeches were not subject to Brandenburg
because, although they did not “incite the type of imminent lawless activity referred to in
criminal syndicalism cases,” they did “go beyond mere advocacy of tax reform.”161 According to
the Eighth Circuit, “the right of free speech is not absolute.” The court cited Justice Hand’s
Masses opinion, ruling that “one may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands.”
Applying Hand’s rationale, the court here ruled Buttorff’s words to be “triggers of action;”162
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therefore, because the defendant advocated, counseled, and advised others in the commission of
a crime, his speech was punishable under the First Amendment.163
This case is nearly indistinguishable in principle from the Ninth Circuit court’s rationale
in US v. Barnett.164 In this case, the Ninth Circuit court ruled that the First Amendment does not
provide publishers a defense as a matter of law to charges of aiding and abetting a crime through
publication and distribution of instructions on how to make illegal drugs. This case involved a
man, Barnett, who was selling PCP synthesis instructions through the mail. Barnett’s defense
was that he was immune from search or prosecution because he used the printed word to
encourage and counsel others in the commission of a crime. He argued that he had a First
Amendment right “to disseminate and exchange this information through the mails even if the
recipients use the same for unlawful purposes.” The court derided as a “specious syllogism”
with “no support in the law” Barnett’s First Amendment defense not only to the search itself, but
also to his prosecution:
“The First Amendment does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply
because the actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose. Crimes, including
that of aiding and abetting, frequently involve the use of speech as part of the
criminal transaction.”165
The principle of Barnett, that the provision of instructions that aid and abet another in
commission of a criminal offense is unprotected by the First Amendment, has been uniformly
accepted, and the principle has been applied to the aiding and abetting of innumerable crimes.166
Notably, the United States Supreme Court relied on the Barnett principle to sustain
aiding and abetting convictions for tax fraud in US v. Freeman.167 In this case, the Ninth Circuit
court held that the defendant could be held criminally liable for counseling tax evasion at
seminars held in protest of the tax laws, even though the speech that served as the predicate for
the conviction “sprang from the anterior motive to effect political or social change.”168 In this

163

Masses, supra note 1.
US v. Barnett 667 F.2d 835 (1982).
165
Id. at 842.
166
Quoting Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Rice v. Paladin, at 245.
167
US v. Freeman 761 F.2d 549 (1985)
168
Id. at 551.
164

44

instance, where an indictment is for counseling, the circumstances of the case determined
whether the First Amendment is applicable, either as a matter of law or as a defense to be
considered by the jury; and the court holds that there can be some instances where speech is so
close in time and substance to ultimate criminal conduct that the speech is punishable.
Much like Buttorff, the defendant in this case was convicted of criminally counseling tax
evasion at seminars; however, in this instance the defendant, Freeman, contended his actions
were done in protest of tax laws. Therefore, Freeman invoked the First Amendment in his
defense, claiming innocence based on the notion that his actions “sprang from the anterior
motive to effect political or social change.”169 The court rejected Freeman’s defense, ruling that
his speech was not constitutionally protected:
“The First Amendment is quite irrelevant if the intent of the actor and the
objective meaning of the words used are so close in time and purpose to a
substantive evil as to become part of the ultimate crime itself. In those instances,
where speech becomes an integral part of the crime, a First Amendment defense
is foreclosed even if the prosecution rests on words alone.”170
With its decision, the court held that there can be some instances where speech is so close
in time and substance to ultimate criminal conduct that no free speech is appropriate. The court
went on to conclude that a First Amendment instruction was required only for those counts as to
which there was evidence that the speaker “directed his comments at the unfairness of the tax
laws generally, without soliciting or counseling a violation of the law in an immediate sense
[and] made statements that, at least arguably, were of abstract generality, remote from advice to
commit a specific criminal act.”171
According to this court:
“Freeman claims he did nothing more than advocate tax non‐compliance as an
abstract idea, or at most as a remote act, and that the First Amendment
necessarily bars his prosecution. In this he is incorrect. Where there is some
evidence, however, that the purpose of the speaker or the tendency of his words
169
170
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are directed to ideas or consequences remote from the commission of a crime or
criminal act, a defense based on the First Amendment is a legitimate matter for
the jury’s consideration. In some instances, he made statements that, at least
arguably, were of abstract generality, remote from advice to commit a specific
criminal act. There was on the other hand, substantial evidence of Freeman’s use
of words of incitement quite proximate to the crime of filing false tax returns,
words both intended and likely to produce an imminent criminal act.”
For those counts as to which the defendant, through his speech, directly assisted in the
preparation and review of false tax returns, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to a
First Amendment instruction at all.172 Therefore, because there existed substantial evidence of
Freeman’s use of words of incitement that were proximate to the crime, the court ruled that his
words were both intended to and likely to produce an immediate criminal act.
Although the Supreme Court ruled in Brandenburg that abstract advocacy of lawlessness
is protected speech under the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit, citing Freeman, held
Brandenburg inapplicable in the case of US v. Mendelsohn.173 In this instance, the court upheld the
conviction of the defendants, who were charged with conspiring to transport and aiding and
abetting the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia. The defendants were arrested
for disseminating a computer program that assisted others to record and analyze bets on sporting
events, and the court ruled that the program was “too instrumental in and intertwined with the
performance of criminal activity to retain First Amendment protection.”174
Citing Freeman, the Ninth Circuit concluded:
“For a First Amendment instruction to meet these requirements (supported by
laws and had some foundation in the evidence), there must be some evidence
that the defendants’ speech was informational in a manner removed from
immediate connection to the commission of a specific criminal act.”175
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Like every other court to address this issue, the Fourth Circuit also had concluded on
numerous occasions that the First Amendment is generally not applicable to charges involving
aiding and abetting violations of tax laws.176 However, in the case of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises,
Inc.,177 the Fourth Circuit extended that rationale to a book publishing company that released a
“hit man” instruction book that assisted a murderer in soliciting, preparing for, and committing
murders. As a result, the court held that “the First Amendment does not pose a bar to finding
that Paladin is civilly liable as an aider and abetter of a triple contact murder.”178
In this case, James Edward Perry, “readied by the instructions and steeled by the
seductive adjurations”179 from Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, broke into
Mildred Horn’s Maryland home and brutally killed Mrs. Horn; her eight‐year‐old quadriplegic
son, Trevor; and Janice Saunders, Trevor’s nurse. According to the court, Perry acted by all
means as a contract killer—a “hit man”—hired by Mildred Horn’s ex‐husband, Lawrence Horn,
to murder Horn’s family so Horn could inherit the $2 million trust fund that had been set aside to
care for Trevor’s condition. The court noted the connection between the book and the action:
“In soliciting, preparing for, and committing these murders, Perry meticulously
followed countless of Hit Man’s 130 pages of detailed factual instructions on how
to murder and to become a professional killer.”180
In Paladin, the Fourth Circuit United States Court of Appeals overturned the lower
court’s summary judgment in the publisher’s favor, holding that the book’s information could

176

US v. Kelley 769 F.2d 215 (1985). Court held defendant who “participated” in the preparation of false
tax forms for others by telling listeners “what to do and how to prepare the forms” and by supplying forms
and materials was not entitled to protections of the First Amendment, even though the defendant offered his
advice in a meeting of a group concededly dedicated to the political belief “that the federal income tax is
unconstitutional as applied to wages,” (id. at 216). The court held that “the cloak of the First Amendment
envelops critical, but abstract discussion of existing laws, but lends no protection to speech which urges the
listeners to commit violations of current law. It was no theoretical discussion of non-compliance with laws;
action was urged; the advice was heeded, and false forms were filed,” (at 217).
US v. Fleschner 98 F.3d 155 (1996). Fourth Circuit held that defendants who instructed and advised
meeting attendees to file unlawful tax returns were not entitled to a First Amendment jury instruction on the
charge of conspiracy to defraud the United States of income tax revenue because “the defendant’s’ words
and acts were not remote from the commission of the criminal acts,” (at 158-59).
177
Rice v. Paladin 128 F.3d 233 (1997).
178
Id. at 243.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 239.

47

fall outside the realm of protected speech, despite the fact that the book did not specifically call
for James Perry to murder Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders.
“[The First Amendment] would not relieve from liability those who would, for
profit or other motive, intentionally assist and encourage crime and then
shamelessly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First Amendment….at the very
least where a speaker—individual or media—acts with the purpose of assisting
in the commission of crime, we do not believe that the First Amendment
insulates that speaker from responsibility for his actions simply because he may
have disseminated his message to a wide audience….”181
The court ruled the very nature of the book’s speech was dangerous because of the harm
it facilitated. The Fourth Circuit’s rationale in this case created the possibility of extending
liability to those who disseminate harmful information to the public at large, and the court
insisted that the First Amendment did not bar the imposition of civil liability for speech that the
plaintiff can demonstrate was performed with specific intent.182
In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court distinguished between mere advocacy of lawlessness
doctrines, and inciting or encouraging lawless action. Consequently, the Court has ruled that the
First Amendment does not allow the state to punish the mere advocacy of an abstract doctrine.
However, the Fourth Circuit in this case ruled that Hitman was not advocacy in any way, but
rather instead was an instructional manual without relevant communicative value.183 Therefore,
Hitman found no preserve in the First Amendment because it “methodically and
comprehensively prepare[d] and steele[d] its audience to specific criminal conduct through
exhaustively detailed instructions on the planning, commission, and concealment of criminal
conduct.”184
Both Barnett and Paladin show the fact that the harmful speech involved was the printed
word does not prohibit the punishment of speech. If speech causes unintentional harm through
negligence and foreseeability, or if the speech causes intentional harm through incitement or
181
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aiding and abetting, the courts have ruled in cases from Masses to Paladin that such speech is
unprotected under the First Amendment.
In the case of Jeffrey Curley, the fact that harm occurred is irrefutable. The question of
NAMBLA’s involvement in the murder, however, is debatable. This legal foundation set forth by
the courts concerning harmful speech allows for the punishment of speech under certain specific
circumstances. However, the courts have also set forth the doctrine that abstract advocacy
cannot be punished.
The conundrum of the Curley case against NAMBLA is the categorization of NAMBLA’s
speech. The Curleys claim the speech is harmful speech in the same vein as cases like Paladin,
Weirum, and Braun. NAMBLA contends, however, that its speech is unpunishable under Masses
and Brandenburg because the speech does not urge others to commit harm, nor does the speech
call for harm against specified individuals. A closer look at the facts of the case will reveal the
best means to characterize NAMBLA’s speech.
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CHAPTER 3

PUNISHING PEDOPHILIC SPEECH THAT
INSTIGATES HARM

The rationale for NAMBLA’s defense seems to be based on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Masses. In that case, Justice Hand articulated the notion that abstract advocacy that does not
call for illegal activity is not punishable under the First Amendment.185
According to its website, NAMBLA exists to enact “social change and tolerance”186 of
pedophilia as opposed to violence. NAMBLA contends the information presented on its website
and in its bulletins constitute mere advocacy of an alternative lifestyle. Furthermore, NAMBLA
maintains that the information it disseminates condemns sex abuse and coercive sexual relations.
According to its website and bulletin, NAMBLA holds firmly to the idea that pedophiles are an
oppressed minority that suffers discrimination in the legal system because of their belief that men
and boys should legally be able to engage in sexual relationships with each other. Although
NAMBLA admits that it opposes age‐of‐consent laws and that it supplies its members with
pornographic material, NAMBLA does not urge, advocate, or condone raping young male
children.

In its defense against the Curleys’ charges, NAMBLA claims that the incitement

allegations levied against the organization are an imposition upon its First Amendment right of
political speech.
NAMBLA also contends that even if an illegal form of advocacy can be perceived from
these Internet and print materials, the Curleys’ action is nonetheless barred by the First
Amendment under Brandenburg. First, NAMBLA claims that because the plaintiffs do not allege
185
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that the so‐called advocacy was directed to any particular person, but rather to the public at
large, the speech cannot be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.”187
NAMBLA argues that targeting speech to a particular individual is necessary in order to
constitute advocacy. NAMBLA goes on to contend that any conduct arguably advocated by its
publications was not imminent—in other words, Jeffrey Curley’s death was not the likely result
of the information presented in NAMBLA’s publications.
The Curley case against NAMBLA illustrates a loophole in the law which allows groups
like NAMBLA to get away with facilitating harm, and the purpose of this Thesis is to close that
loophole in order to prevent harm to children.

For example, the rhetoric presented on

NAMBLA’s website may be legal because of the generality of its content. But the website is
merely a portal for traveling deeper into the world of pedophilia. Through the website, one can
sign up to become a member of NAMBLA.

Once joining, a member is allowed access to

questionable publications like “Rape and Escape” and “The Survival Manual,” which have the
potential to cause harm.188 This loophole in the law permits groups who publish this harmful
information to exist without prohibition.
The law as it stands now is flawed because it allows these types of organizations to
disseminate such speech that is capable of facilitating harm, which is defined by state criminal
law. Unfortunately, as previously explained, the existing standards for punishing this speech do
not work because they fail to address specific aspects like harm, intent, and proximate cause.
Other standards, like Crump’s Camouflaged Incitement and Malloy’s and Krotoszynski’s notion
of Harm Advocacy, fail in their attempt because these standards are based on speculation—they
adopt a case‐by‐case analysis for determining liability. They do not provide a specific, generic
measure by which liability can be determined. Because of this deficiency, the courts are in
desperate need of a concrete, constitutionally sound standard that can stop harmful speech that
facilitates violence but is not directed toward specific individuals.
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With cases like Weirum, Paladin, and Braun, the courts have ruled that speech that
facilitates harm is not protected under the First Amendment; however, despite their rulings, the
courts failed to set forth a specific standard by which liability can be determined. By failing to
create a specific, constitutionally sound standard, these decisions have left intact a certain
ambiguity that continues to plague the American legal system in regards to the constitutionality
of certain harmful speech.

THE CATALYST TO HARM STANDARD
The purpose of this Thesis is to create a specific standard that can be applied to cases like
the NAMBLA case, which involves speech that facilitates harm. This Catalyst to Harm Standard
will set forth specific criteria for courts to follow so that they can factually determine if the speech
in question falls into the category of protected or unprotected speech. As of now, the line
between protected and unprotected speech remains blurry. This standard attempts to clarify that
line.
Because NAMBLA is categorizing its speech as pure political expression, the protection
of the First Amendment is operating at its highest level. However, at its core NAMBLA’s speech
seems to constitute criminal advocacy—encouraging sexual relations between grown men young
boys189—the court should determine if NAMBLA’s speech is in fact punishable under the First
Amendment once that speech translates into harmful action. To determine if NAMBLA’s speech
falls outside the protection of the First Amendment, the court should determine if NAMBLA’s
speech constitutes advocacy and is in fact low‐value speech as opposed to high‐value Political
Speech.
The Catalyst to Harm Standard will determine if NAMBLA’s speech in this instance falls
within the narrow spectrum of expression that both instigates and facilitates illegal activities
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against others.

190

Furthermore, the Catalyst to Harm Standard relaxes the “imminence”

requirement set forth in Brandenburg; consequently, it does not require that the speech in question
be specific in regards to a time frame for violence against precise, identifiable victims. This
relaxation is necessary because the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brandenburg does in fact limit the
government’s ability to proscribe certain speech. Brandenburg’s imminence requirement responds
to a suspicion that the government may seek to suppress certain questionable or unpopular
speech for improper reasons.
By creating this imminence requirement in Brandenburg, the United States Supreme Court
developed a measure to ensure that the danger posed by the speech is in fact certain and not
speculative, and that the government’s interest in preventing the violence is not pretextual.
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Vague or overbroad speech regulations violate the Constitution because they punish protected
speech or act effectively as prior restraints192 through their chilling effect.193
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment does permit
viewpoint‐neutral speech regulations and prohibitions in order to achieve important social goals.
These prohibitions are allowable only when the social risks created by the speech in question
clearly exceed the benefits potentially associated with it. 194 The fact that someone engages in
speech activity or expressive conduct does not automatically insulate them from liability for the
social harms caused by their speech activity or expressive conduct—sometimes the costs are
imposed on the speaker and other times they are not.
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The first element of Brandenburg basically involves determining the intent of the sender.
As laid forth earlier, the intent of NAMBLA’s speech could be labeled as malicious because the
organization seems to have been grossly indifferent to the risk of harm associated with its
speech.195 This evaluation of is necessary to avoid imposing liability on speech that should
remain protected. The first element of Brandenburg is necessary to separate simple advocacy from
speech that prepares and encourages a group for violent action.” In situations where liability is
imposed after the harm has resulted, as in this case, the third element is indisputable met.196
It is the second element—the requirement that the harmful action be imminent—that
creates a nearly impossible hurdle197 to imposing liability to groups like NAMBLA.

The

importance of Brandenburg’s imminence standard is to justify a restraint on speech prior to the
commission of violent activity.198

There is no need for the imminence requirement when

punishing speech that has already occurred.199 The purpose of the Catalyst to Harm standard is
not to prevent violence that might occur as a result of harmful forms of speech such as pedophilic
speech; instead, its purpose is to limit any speech that instigates potentially harmful criminal
activity.
In cases such as this where the punishment of speech comes about subsequent to the
speech itself, such regulation is conducted with the benefit of hindsight. Therefore, courts can
determine the expression in question actually has caused a legally cognizable harm. When
speech is responsible for such a harm its punishment is justified by this causal connection.200 As
long as the plaintiffs can prove that harmful activity did occur, the speech in question rose
beyond an abstract level of advocacy, and that the harm that came about was a result of the
speech, then the imposition of this liability against the speaker does not offend the First
Amendment.201 The Catalyst to Harm Standard is grounded in the notion that it is unjustifiable
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to impose ex‐post facto punishments for consequence‐free speech.202

However, NAMBLA’s

speech in this instance appears to have been a factor in instigating violence. As stated earlier, the
Curleys can theoretically hold NAMBLA’s speech responsible for the death of their son based on
the Catalyst to Violence standard. The Catalyst to Harm standard does not require Brandenburg’s
imminence standard in order to link NAMBLA’s speech to the harm that occurred to Jeffrey
Curley. Based on decisions in cases such as Paladin and Braun, relaxing the imminence standard
is constitutionally feasible in cases where speech was a significant catalyst in brining about harm.
Much like the standard of Harm Advocacy,203 the Catalyst to Harm Standard labels
certain speech as “bad” not because of its ideological or social content, but because it is speech
that is linked to a definitive social harm that the legislature has the constitutional authority to
prevent or punish. In order to determine if the speech in question meets the requirements for the
Catalyst to Harm Standard, the plaintiff must (1) establish the harm that actually resulted, (2)
establish the advocacy of harm within the speech in question, and (3) establish a causal
connection between the speech and the harm that occurred.
1.

Speech that Results in Harm (Establishing that Harm Actually Occurred)
The first step in applying the Catalyst to Harm Standard is to determine that harm

actually occurred so that liability can be constitutionally imposed. Speech that does not result in
action is unpunishable;204 however, the right to free speech is not absolute.

The popular

reasoning that one may not lawfully yell “Fire!” in a crowded theater is an example of the way in
which the First Amendment yields to the need to prevent potentially dangerous disorder.205 As
Justice Hand reasoned in Masses:
“One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands. Words are
not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, and those which have
no purport but to counsel the violation of the law cannot by any latitude of
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interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of
government in a democratic state…”206
The Court echoed Justice Hand’s reasoning in Gitlow:
“Freedom of speech and of the press, as secured by the Constitution, is not an
absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility…That a state in the
exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by
utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite
to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question.”207
As was set forth by the Court in cases like Masses and Gitlow, the First Amendment does
not protect violence or words that incite violence. Lower courts have extended this rationale to
third parties with the decision in Weirum. This case is often cited as a case of true incitement in
the same vein as Brandenburg, a decision based on the premise of incitement of a live audience to
imminent lawless and harmful action.
“If the likelihood that a third person may react in a particular manner is a hazard
which makes the actor negligent, such reaction whether innocent or negligent
does not prevent the actor from being liable for the harm caused thereby…It is of
no consequence that the harm to decedent was inflicted by third parties acting
negligently.”208
The First Amendment does not protect violence,209 and words tending to lead to or that
actually instigate violence enjoy no greater protection than do the violent acts themselves.210 The
first element of the Catalyst to Harm Standard does not deal with abstract advocacy; instead, the
first element establishes that harm actually occurred. This requirement is important because it
calls for the punishment of speech that is tied to harmful action; therefore, it insures that
advocacy of abstract doctrines that does not result in harm is not unfairly punished.
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2.

Speech that Advocates Harm (Intent of the Speaker)
The first element of Brandenburg basically involves determining the intent of the sender.

This evaluation is necessary to avoid imposing liability on speech that should remain protected—
the first element of Brandenburg is necessary to separate speech that is “mere advocacy” from
speech that “prepar[es] a group for violent action and steel [s] it to such action.” 211
Advocacy alone of certain unpopular behavior remains fully protected under the First
Amendment.

If no legitimately proscribed harm results from the speech at issue, then

punishment of the speech cannot be constitutionally justified. This is so because, in theoretical
terms, the marketplace of ideas never ceased to function. Because the speech did not result in
harm, the opportunity exists for counterspeech to combat the lesser speech. However, once that
speech facilitates action, then speech loses its constitutional protection and becomes punishable
because speech that causes action causes harm. Speech that does nothing more than facilitate a
socially harmful act such as murder does not enjoy First Amendment protection, and the
Supreme Court has refused to afford speech such as obscenity and child pornography First
Amendment protection—the same rationale should apply to speech that instigates harmful
action.
To establish that speech activity in question can be judged by the Catalyst to Harm
Standard, the plaintiff would need to show that the speaker specifically desired to cause the
resulting harm and must have hoped that circumstances would be created such that the harm
will ensue, or the speaker must be proven to have been grossly indifferent to the known risk of
the harm associated with the work at issue.
This requirement is perhaps best exemplified in Paladin—where the Fourth Circuit court
held that the book Hit Man, which was a 130‐page detailed, factual instruction manual on how to
murder and to become a professional killer—fell outside the realm of protected speech:
“[The First Amendment] would not relieve from liability those who would, for
profit or other motive, intentionally assist and encourage crime and then
shamelessly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First Amendment…at the very
least where a speaker—individual or media—acts with the purpose of assisting
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in the commission of crime, we do not believe that the First Amendment
insulates that speaker from responsibility for his actions simply because he may
have disseminated his message to a wide audience…212
In her article, Beth Fagan determined that the First Amendment would not “bar the
imposition of civil liability for speech that the plaintiff can demonstrate was performed with
specific intent” to cause harm. 213
Likewise, in Braun, the Eleventh Circuit held that a published advertisement calling for a
“GUN FOR HIRE” created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm of potentially violent,
criminal activity:
“Our review of the language of the ad persuades us that SOF had a legal duty to
refrain from publishing it…The ad’s combination of sinister terms makes it
apparent that there was a substantial danger of harm to the public…”214
The only defense based on the First Amendment is if the speech in question is of abstract
generality, without counseling or solicitation.

Both Paladin and Braun fall outside of this

protected category of speech because the respective courts ruled that the speech involved in these
cases was designed to result in harm. Likewise, according to the Ninth Circuit in Freeman, any
speech that directly assists in the preparation and review of criminal activity is not entitled to
First Amendment protection:
“The First Amendment is quite irrelevant if the intent of the actor and the
objective meaning of the words used are so close in time and purpose to a
substantive evil as to become part of the ultimate crime itself. In those instances,
where speech becomes an integral part of the crime, a First Amendment defense
is foreclosed even if the prosecution rests on words alone.”215
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Because the content of the speech is important in establishing the intent necessary to
determine whether speech constitutes instigation, a reviewing court also must consider the
context in which the author disseminated the speech. When a publisher distributes materials that
are highly coercive in facilitating a crime, a reasonable court would have to consider that the
publisher intended to produce a specific criminal response or at least knew that such a crime
indeed might be committed.
When one combines a sufficiently demanding level of intent with the occurrence of a grave
harm, it becomes reasonable for the law to tax the social costs of instigating speech against the
speaker.216 In essence, if someone speaks with the intent to cause harm, then, according to the
courts’ decisions in Paladin, Braun, and Freeman, the speech is just as punishable as the criminal
harm that occurred.
3.

Establishing a Causal Connection between the Speech and the Harm (Evidence of
Connection)
However, in order to implicate speech in the commission of a crime, the plaintiff would need

to prove that the speech at issue actually caused or was a substantial factor in the commission of
a criminal act or intentional tort in order to enact the third requirement of the Catalyst to Harm
Standard. In the case of Paladin, the First Amendment did not prevent Paladin from being held
civilly liable as an aider and abetter of a triple contract murder because Hit Man served to steel
and ready James Perry to murder.217
In Braun, the Eleventh Circuit linked the ad to the murder by the sinister language that was
used:
“…we agree with the district court that ‘the language of this ad is such that, even
though couched in terms not explicitly offering criminal services, the publisher
could recognize the offer of criminal activity as readily as its readers obviously
did.’”
Likewise, the defendants in Mendelsohn were arrested for disseminating a computer program
that facilitated illegal sports bets.

The Ninth Circuit ruled that the program was “too

instrumental and intertwined with the performance of criminal activity to retain First
216
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Amendment protection.”218 When governmental punishment of speech occurs subsequent to the
speech itself, such punishment is conducted with the benefit of hindsight. This is important
because hindsight enables the courts to discern whether the speech in question instigated any
legally cognizable harm. Therefore, when such speech is responsible for creating, facilitating, or
instigating harm, its punishment is justified by this causal connection between the speech and the
harm.219
As stated earlier, the purpose of the Catalyst to Harm Standard is not to impose an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. Because this standard requires the establishment that
a specific harm did occur, the Catalyst to Harm Standard only applies to speech that has
allegedly facilitated harm.

In adhering to the Marketplace doctrine, this standard is a

punishment only for certain speech that is too instrumental and intertwined with the
performance of criminal activity to retain First Amendment protection.

TESTING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE CATALYST TO HARM STANDARD
The Catalyst to Harm Standard must be tested against previous court decisions in order
to determine the standard’s constitutionality. By applying the Standard to established precedent,
we can assess its constitutionality.
The case of Weirum actually resulted in media liability under the rationale of
incitement—in this instance, a radio station facilitated the death of a motorist by urging driving
listeners to find one of the radio station’s DJs. The court ruled the outcome was unintentional but
predictable, and the court reasoned that the contest was directed to incitement of imminent
lawless action in the form of reckless driving, and that it therefore was not protected by the First
Amendment.220
Despite its decision, the court failed to create a standard for future reference. In applying
the Catalyst to Harm Standard to this case, actual harm needs to be established—here, the actual
217

Paladin at 239.
Mendelsohn at 1186.
219
Brown, supra note 14.
218

60

harm was the death of a motorist. The second requirement is to determining the intent of the
speaker. The defendant in Weirum had no apparent intent to cause illegal results or any kind of
harm.

However, the radio station intentionally uttered the words and created dangerous

circumstances; therefore, the speech was directed to inciting, as well as likely to incite, harmful
conduct. The third requirement is establishing a causal connection between the speech and the
harm. The radio station was promoting itself through a contest encouraging drivers to race
around the city to find one of the station’s DJs who had in his possession a sum of money. The
drivers who caused the accident in which a motorist was killed were participating in the contest
when the accident happened.
The facts of this case meet the three parts of the Catalyst to Harm standard. Even though the
radio station was not encouraging a specific motorist to race through the city and kill another
specific motorist, the communication was nonetheless the proximate cause of death. The fact that
the results were not intended and the harmful speech was not tailored to an intended receiver
does not preclude the radio station from liability. By applying the Catalyst to Harm Standard,
the court’s decision in Weirum remains the same.
In the Hustler case, Hustler Magazine was sued by the mother and friend of an adolescent boy,
Troy D., who died recreating an act he read about in Hustler. In the “Orgasm of Death” article,
Hustler described a practice known as auto‐erotic asphyxiation, which involves masturbating
while hanging one’s self to cut off the blood supply to the brain at the moment of orgasm. The
boy’s mother sued Hustler on theories of negligence, attractive nuisance, product liability, and
strict liability founded on dangerous instrumentality. However, the Fifth Circuit court afforded
no liability to Hustler because the article served some sort of educational purpose and did not
exist solely as a commercial, money‐making tool, distinguishing this case from the Weirum
rationale. In addition, Hustler was not liable because the magazine repeatedly attempted to
dissuade its readers from conducting the dangerous activity.
In applying the Catalyst to Harm Standard, the resulting harm in this case is the death of the
14‐year‐old Troy D. The connection between the speech and the harm is evident here as well—
Troy’s body was found hanging nude in his closet with a copy of article on the ground near the
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body. The intent of the speaker is in question here. The issue in this case is whether or not
Hustler Magazine intended the harm that resulted, or if Hustler was negligent in its publication of
the article. It seems in this instance that Hustler did not show a gross indifference to the risk of
harm that might come about a result of this article, nor did the magazine hope to create
circumstances in which a death would result. These assertions are solid because, unlike the radio
broadcast in Wierum, this article was not published solely for the purpose of making money.
Also, Hustler included within the article a number of advisories dissuading readers from
conducting this act. Because of these advisories, the court correctly concluded that Hustler was
not advocating harm and was in fact hoping to avoid harm. As a result of Hustler’s attempts to
discourage its readers from performing this dangerous act, as well as the educational nature of
the article, Hustler Magazine is not liable for the boy’s tragic death. Therefore, Hustler’s speech in
this case did not meet the necessary requirements for liability as set forth by the Catalyst to Harm
Standard.
The Fifth Circuit court in Eimann rejected a wrongful death action involving an
advertisement referring to “high risk assignments” that ran in Soldier of Fortune Magazine (SOF).
In this instance, the son and mother of the murder victim brought a wrongful death claim against
SOF, seeking to hold SOF liable for publishing a personal service ad through which the victim’s
husband hired an assassin to kill her. A lower court found for the plaintiffs, but the Fifth Circuit
court reversed the verdict, holding that SOF could only be held liable if “(1) the relation to illegal
activity appears on the ad’s face; or (2) ‘the advertisement, embroidered by its context, would
lead a reasonable publisher or ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances to
conclude that the ad could reasonably be interpreted’ as an offer to commit crimes.”221
In applying the Catalyst to Harm Standard to this case, the speech must have resulted in
harm. In this instance, the harm that resulted was murder. Next, the intent of the speaker, SOF,
must be established. In order to hold SOF responsible for the death, the plaintiffs would need to
determine that the magazine specifically desired to cause harm and hoped that the speech would
create circumstances in which such harm would ensue; or the plaintiffs must prove SOF to have
been grossly indifferent to the known risk of the harm associated with work at issue. Based on
the facts, one could reasonably conclude that SOF did not specifically intend for an assassin to
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kill an innocent woman. However, the notion that SOF was grossly indifferent to the known risk
of harm is questionable. SOF ran an ad that referred to “high risk assignments”—this phrase is
ambiguous, and the Fifth Circuit court in this case ruled that SOF could not be held liable for the
murder because of the ad’s ambiguity.
“…virtually anything might involve illegal activity, and that applying the district
court’s standard would mean that a publisher ‘must reject all ambiguous ads,’ or
risk liability for any ‘untoward consequences that flow from his decision to
publish’ them.”222
Likewise, SOF is not liable under the Catalyst to Harm Standard because requiring the
magazine to determine that “high risk assignments” as potentially harmful is placing too much of
a burden of interpretation on SOF; also, “high risk assignments” is too vague for SOF to
determine that the phrase would be a catalyst to harm. Therefore, the ruling remains the same in
this case because “high risk assignments” is too ambiguous to apply liability to SOF on the basis
of gross indifference to a known risk of harm. Because SOF is not liable under the second
element Catalyst to Harm Standard, the applying the third element of the Catalyst to Harm
Standard—causal connection— is unnecessary.
In the case of Braun, a man named Richard Savage ran the following advertisement in Soldier
of Fortune: “GUN FOR HIRE: 37‐year‐old professional mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam Veteran.
Discreet and very private. Bodyguard, courier and other special skills. All jobs considered.”
After reading the advertisement, a man named Bruce Gastwirth hired Savage to murder
Gastwirth’s business associate, Richard Braun. Braun was gunned down outside his home in
Atlanta, and Gastwirth and Savage were convicted of criminal conspiracy. Braun’s two sons later
filed a civil suit seeking damages for Soldier of Fortune’s involvement in their father’s murder.
Like in the Eimann case, the resulting harm as a result of SOF’s speech was murder.
However, unlike Eimann, the intent of the magazine in publishing the ad falls more on the side of
gross indifference. While SOF did not intend for the ad to specifically result in murder, the
magazine ignored red‐flag phrases like “GUN FOR HIRE,” “professional mercenary,” and
“discreet and private.” Therefore, SOF’s speech in this case can be labeled as grossly indifferent
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to anticipated harm because the magazine should have been able to interpret that this specific
advertisement was a call to harmful action. The connection between SOF and Gastwirth and
Savage is established through testimony—Savage ran the ad in SOF, Gastwirth saw the ad in
SOF, and Gastwirth subsequently hired Savage to murder Richard Braun. Because a causal
connection can be established among Savage, SOF, and Gastwirth, SOF’s speech in this case
meets the requirements for liability according to the Catalyst to Violence Standard:
“…[the] advertisement ‘on its face’ would have alerted a reasonably prudent
publisher that the ‘ad in question contained a clearly identifiable unreasonable
risk, that the offer in the ad is one to commit a serious violent crime.’”223
The Fifth Circuit already has applied a relaxed imminence standard in this case by not
requiring that Savage’s actions be immediate—SOF was a conduit for the harm that transpired;
therefore, the notion that the harm must be imminent is not necessary to assign liability in this
case.
By applying the Catalyst to Harm Standard, the decision remains the same because the facts
of the case meet the requirements necessary for the Catalyst to Harm Standard to be applicable.
Instead of a stand‐alone decision, in applying the Catalyst to Harm Standard, the courts now
have specified criteria that can more solidly determine liability in a case such as this one.
With the Paladin decision, the Fourth Circuit Court held the publisher of Hitman liable for a
murder committed by one of the book’s readers. Using the Catalyst to Harm Standard, the ruling
would remain the same. In fact, it is a perfect example of the relaxed imminence standard at
work. In this case, the book was labeled as a how‐to manual for would‐be assassins, and the
publisher conceded that it knew and intended its instruction manual to aid in the commission of
murder. In its defense, the publisher claimed protection under the First Amendment.
The harm established is the murder of three people—Mildred Horn, her eight‐year‐old
quadriplegic son Trevor, and Trevor’s nurse, Janice Saunders—by a man named James Perry,
who was acting as a contract killer. Perry was acting as hitman in this instance, following the
step‐by‐step instructions in the book to murder the three victims. The second element is to
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determine the intent of the speaker. By publishing what in essence is a “how to” manual of
murder, Paladin Enterprises acted with gross indifference to the harm that would logically occur.
“…at the very least where a speaker—individual or media—acts with the
purpose of assisting in the commission of a crime, we do not believe the First
Amendment insulates that speaker from responsibility for his actions simply
because he may have disseminated his message to a wide audience.”224
The third requirement is to establish a connection between the speech and the harm. Police
found Hitman in Perry’s possession, and medical examiners determined that Perry followed the
book’s instructions when he murdered the three victims and disposed of their bodies.
“In soliciting, preparing for, and committing these murders, Perry meticulously
followed countless of Hit Man’s 130 pages of detailed factual instructions on how
to murder and to become a professional killer.”225
The facts in this case meet the requirements for the Catalyst to Harm Standard. Although the
threat of murder did not meet the Brandenburg definition of immediate incitement to violence, the
facts show that Hitman was an instrumental factor in facilitating the murder of Mildred Horn,
Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders. Therefore, the court in this case was correct in its decision to
implicate Paladin Enterprises as an abettor of this horrendous crime.

Like the rationale in

Weirum, Paladin Enterprises did not specifically instruct James Perry to murder the three specific
victims; however, Hitman set forth specific instructions on how to efficiently murder someone
and how to properly dispose of the body. Perry followed these instructions implicitly as he
murdered the three victims. Although Paladin did not instruct Perry to murder these specific
people, the instructions contained in the book were enough of an incitement to violence, and the
implication of Paladin in the case does not require the speech in Hitman to pose an immediate
and imminent threat.
“…the nature of the speech itself, strongly suggests that the audience both
targeted and actually reached is, in actuality, very narrowly confined, as in the
case before us.”226
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The outcome of this case remains the same even after the application of the Catalyst to
Harm Standard; however, by applying this standard, the ruling is more specified as to how it was
decided.
The review of cases illustrates the constitutional validity of the Catalyst to Harm
Standard. The Massachusetts court should follow the same reasoning in its review of the Curley
case. Because the Catalyst to Harm is constitutionally secure, then the Standard can be applied to
determine if any liability can be assigned to NAMBLA’s speech because of its involvement in the
murder of Jeffrey Curley.

APPLYING THE CATALYST TO HARM STANDARD TO
THE JEFFREY CURLEY CASE
Because NAMBLA’s speech in the case of Jeffrey Curley seems to meet the requirements for
classification as a Catalyst to Harm, then it is highly likely that a reasonable court could deem
NAMBLA’s advocacy as low‐value speech rather than high‐value speech. In an instance such as
this, when speech has resulted in a significant public harm, the social value of the speech is not
sufficient to overcome the harm involved. Here, the state has a substantial interest in punishing
speech that has caused a crime, particularly a crime that has resulted in serious bodily harm and
death. Because the constitutionality of the speech of an unpopular “minority” organization like
NAMBLA is in doubt, a high burden should be placed on the court to justify imposing liability
for the consequences of speech activity. Nevertheless, a high burden in theory should not prove
to be an insurmountable burden in practice. The victims of those who use speech as a means of
facilitating and instigating harm should not be denied a meaningful remedy on the theory that
the First Amendment privileges the advocacy of a de facto accomplice before the fact. When
cases arise that meet reasonable speech‐protected standards of liability, such as this case, the
court must be willing and able to impose liability.227
In its defense, however, NAMBLA claims that its pedophilic speech is not targeted to a
specific person; instead, the speech is directed to the public at large, and the speech cannot be
directing to inciting or producing imminent lawless action. Therefore, the speech in question is
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not punishable under Brandenburg because, according to NAMBLA, advocacy exists only when
speech is aimed at a specific individual.

NAMBLA also claims that any conduct arguably

advocated by the NAMBLA Bulletin or any other publication was not imminent and is not
punishable.
NAMBLA’s defense strategy is based on the notion that its speech is directed to the
public at large rather than specified receivers; NAMBLA also maintains that any speech put forth
by the organization does not constitute the Brandenburg definition of “imminent lawless conduct”
because the harm to Jeffrey Curley was not immediate.228

Because NAMBLA is using

Brandenburg as the cornerstone of its defense, then the Brandenburg analysis of speech that incites
lawless conduct must be circumvented in order to punish this speech that meets the requirements
for the Catalyst to Harm Standard.
The fist step in applying the Catalyst to Harm Standard to the Curley case is to determine
the harm that occurred. As stated earlier, the harm involved in this case is the murder of Jeffrey
Curley by Charles Jaynes and Salvatore Sicari. According to police, NAMBLA members and
homosexual lovers Jaynes and Sicari picked up fifth‐grader Jeffrey Curley and took the boy to the
Boston Public Library where Jaynes accessed NAMBLA’s website in order to gain psychological
comfort for what he was about to do, which was attempt to sexually assault Curley. The 10‐year‐
old fought back, however, and in an attempt to restrain him, Jaynes gagged the boy with a
gasoline‐soaked rag, eventually killing him. The men then put Jeffrey’s body in a tub with
concrete and threw it into a river.229 The Curley’s lawsuit against NAMBLA claims that prior to
the murder, Jaynes had been stalking Jeffrey Curley. As evident by the horrendous actions of
Jaynes and Sicari, the harm that resulted in this case was attempted molestation and eventual
murder of Jeffrey Curley.230
The second step is to establish the intent of the speaker. In their wrongful death lawsuit
against NAMBLA, the plaintiffs claim that portions of NAMBLA’s web‐based and print
publications “promoted, advocated, conspired, and urged the general public to rape young male
children and provided information to assist the general public in obtaining child pornography
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and pedophile‐related material.”231 The lawsuit goes on to allege that Jaynes “became obsessed
with having sex with and raping young male children. As a result of reading a NAMBLA
bulletin, he came to cope with his feelings and his desires, an then he came to realize it’s OK to
rape little boys, and that’s what he went and did.”232
In order to hold NAMBLA liable for its part in this murder, the plaintiffs need to show
that NAMBLA either specifically desired to cause the harm by creating circumstances such that
harm would ensue, or that the organization was grossly indifferent to the known risk of the harm
associated with its speech. Because of the Jeffrey Curley incident, NAMBLA and other pedophile
organizations can no longer plead ignorance to the possibility that its speech may cause harm.
However, in the Curley case, it can be argued that NAMBLA created an environment for harm to
occur.
Acting as an overt pedophile organization, NAMBLA provides resources and comfort to
pedophiles seeking information about sexual relationships with boys. NAMBLA disseminates
publications such as the NAMBLA Bulletin, which includes articles and letters defending and
reporting the sexual experiences of NAMBLA members.233 Introduced in the criminal trial was a
NAMBLA publication titled “The Survival Manual: The Man’s Guide to Staying Safe in Man/Boy
Sexual Relationships.”234 In addition, NAMBLA also released a publication titled “Rape and
Escape,” which was described by the plaintiffs as an explicit guide to luring children and then
avoiding prosecution.235 While NAMBLA claims that it does not advocate or condone raping
young male children,236 the evidence of suggests that NAMBLA—with publications such as the
NAMBLA Bulletin, “The Survival Manual,” and “Rape and Escape”—hoped to create
circumstances in which the actual molestation of children could take place.
The third step in establishing the Catalyst to Harm Standard against NAMBLA is for the
plaintiffs to provide evidence of a causal connection between the speech and the harm. Admitted
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into evidence during the criminal trial was Jaynes journal, which was discovered by police after
Jeffrey Curley’s murder. In his journal, Jaynes wrote that finding NAMBLA “was a turning point
in discovering myself. NAMBLA’s Bulletin helped me to become aware of my own sexuality and
acceptance of it.”237

Also introduced into evidence were the NAMBLA publications “The

Survival Manual” and “Rape and Escape,” both of which were found in Jaynes’ possession.
Finally, according to testimony, Jaynes visited NAMBLA’s website from a Boston Public Library
moments before murdering Jeffrey Curley to gain psychological comfort for what he was about
to do, which was attempt to molest and eventually murder the 10‐year‐old boy.238
These facts establish that there was a connection between Charles Jaynes and NAMBLA, and
also that there was a connection between NAMBLA’s speech and the murder of Jeffrey Curley.
Based on these facts, NAMBLA’s speech appears to have been a factor in the murder of Jeffrey
Curley because of the influence it had in motivating Jaynes to stalk, kidnap, and murder the 10
year old. If not for NAMBLA’s involvement in this situation, in the form of advocacy speech,
Charles Jaynes may not have had the motivation and support he needed to commit such a crime.
However, in its defense, NAMBLA claims that its pedophilic speech is not targeted to a
specific person; instead, the speech is directed to the public at large, and the speech cannot be
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action. Therefore, the speech in question is
not punishable under Brandenburg because, according to NAMBLA, advocacy exists only when
speech is aimed at a specific individual.

NAMBLA also claims that any conduct arguably

advocated by the NAMBLA Bulletin or any other publication was not imminent and is not
publishable.
In regards to NAMBLA’s contention that its speech does not constitute advocacy because it
was not targeted to a specific person, the rationale in Wierum invalidates that contention. In that
case, the court ruled that even though the radio station did not intend to cause harm and
therefore had no specific individual in mind as a victim, the station still was guilty of incitement
because of its communication was directed to inciting harmful conduct. Although NAMBLA had
no specific victim in mind, its speech created the circumstances which led to the murder of Jeffrey
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Curley.

Therefore, NAMBLA’s “specific person” rationale is flawed and is fails as a solid

defense. Also, since NAMBLA’s speech in this instance meets the necessary requirements of the
Catalyst to Violence Standard, then NAMBLA’s speech can be labeled as criminal advocacy,
which, based on the Brandenburg definition, is speech that has caused or is likely to cause lawless
action.
Furthermore, because NAMBLA is using Brandenburg’s definition of “imminent lawless
conduct” as the cornerstone of its defense, then the Brandenburg analysis of speech that incites
lawless conduct must be circumvented in order to punish this speech. As set forth earlier, the
first element of Brandenburg basically involves determining the intent of the sender. NAMBLA’s
speech was found to be a catalyst in causing the harm that came to Jeffrey Curley, and the intent
of its speech was to create circumstances in which the molestation of children could take place.
The third element is met in this instance because the plaintiffs are seeking to impose liability on
harm—Jeffrey’s murder— that has already occurred.

Therefore, the second Brandenburg element—the requirement that the harmful action be
imminent—is the crux of NAMBLA’s defense. In a situation such as this, if the court were to rely
solely on Brandenburg as a means to assign liability to speech that facilitated harm, then groups
like NAMBLA that reach a wide, unspecified audience would face no liability because the
“imminent lawless conduct” is a nearly impossible hurdle to overcome. However, by applying
the Catalyst to Harm Standard to this situation (thereby relaxing the Brandenburg’s imminence
requirement), NAMBLA would not be able to hide behind the vale of imminence because the
Catalyst to Harm Standard implicates NAMBLA in the aiding and abetting of Jeffrey Curley’s
murder. At the same time, by relaxing the imminence requirement through the Catalyst to Harm
Standard, NAMBLA is prohibited from using a First Amendment loophole to avoid liability. The
fact that NAMBLA’s advocacy was not imminent according to Brandenburg’s standard does not
preclude the court from holding NAMBLA accountable for the harm brought about by its speech.
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CONCLUSION
With the Catalyst to Harm Standard available to apply to cases involving harmful
speech, the courts now have a specific, clear‐cut standard by which to determine liability. By
establishing the resulting harm, the intent of the speaker, and a proximate connection between
the speech and the harm that occurred, courts as well as speakers now can determine on a point‐
by‐point basis whether the speaker can constitutionally be held responsible for the harmful
results of his speech.
By creating a hybridization of the incitement constitutional standard, the tort law of
negligence, and the crime of aiding and abetting, this standard bridges a gap between the rulings
of the courts and the suggestions of scholars like Crump, Komasara, Malloy, and Krotoszynski.
The specificity of the Catalyst to Harm Standard compensates for the shortcomings of Crump’s
notion of Camouflaged Incitement and Komasara’s idea to relax Brandenburg’s imminence
requirement. Crump’s Camouflaged Incitement falls victim to the same weakness as the courts’
decisions in cases like Weirum, Braun, and Paladin in that they all operate on a case‐by‐case basis.
Komasara’s relaxed imminence standard is deficient in that it does not establish a specific
approach to relaxing the imminence standard. Consequently, these ideas and decisions fail to
create a generic, detailed standard by which liability in instances such as these can be
determined. By implementing directed steps designed to help the courts determine liability in all
cases involving harmful speech, the Catalyst to Harm Standard fills in the gaps left by the courts
and certain scholars.

Speech such as NAMBLA’s is legal as long as it does not facilitate harm.

However, once that speech results in harm, such as the case of Jeffrey Curley, then that speech
must stand up against the Catalyst to Harm Standard in order to avoid liability.
In this instance, the harm that resulted was the tragic death of Jeffrey Curley. The second
step, determining the intent of the sender, is satisfied with the existence of such pictured
publications as the NAMBLA Bulletin, as well as “The Survival Manual” and “Rape and Escape.”
These publications, according to the plaintiffs, serve as specific guides to luring children and then
avoiding prosecution.

With these documents, it is evident that NAMBLA hoped to create

circumstances in which the actual molestation of children could take place. In order to meet the
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requirements for the third step, the plaintiffs need to prove that a proximate connection existed
between NAMBLA’s speech and the harm that resulted. In his journal, Jaynes wrote that finding
NAMBLA “was a turning point in discovering myself. NAMBLAʹs Bulletin helped me to become
aware of my own sexuality and acceptance of it.” But for the Bulletin, Curley would be alive.
NAMBLA’s speech in this instance meets the three requirements for liability under the Catalyst
to Harm Standard. NAMBLA cannot hide behind Brandenburg’s imminence requirement, and it
must answer for its role in the death of Jeffrey Curley.
The Catalyst to Harm Standard provides answers to the questions concerning the
prohibition of questionable speech that were brought about by this case. For instance, despite its
instigating nature, pedophilic speech maintains its constitutional protection as long as the speech
does not facilitate violence. The information NAMBLA disseminates is perfectly legal as long as
that speech is not a factor in the commission of a crime. However, once this speech moves away
from mere advocacy and actually brings about harm, then pedophilic speech loses its
constitutional protection. And this prohibition on such speech is not based on the subject matter
involved; instead, the speech is rendered punishable because of the criminal harm that is attached
to it.
Some members of the media may be concerned at the possible chilling effects of the
Catalyst to Harm Standard, but this concern is misplaced because of the high burden of proof
that the Standard requires. The Constitution refers to a free and responsible press, and in order
to avoid any type of liability, the media need only to avoid irresponsible behavior, such as
broadcasting the type of speech that has the potential to cause harm (such as the speech in
Weirum). The media can easily shield themselves from liability by issuing an advisory before
they broadcast or publish inflammatory speech.

Consequently, the media remain free and

responsible, and the virtue of the First Amendment remains intact.
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